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INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, Louisiana adopted a law mandating that “[a] person
who is arrested for a felony sex offense or other specified offense . . . shall
have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted
1
pursuant to the booking procedure.” Today, at least twenty-eight states and
the federal government have laws providing for DNA sampling before
2
conviction (“DNA-BC”). Most other countries with DNA databases also
3
collect samples on arrest.
These laws enjoyed a placid childhood, with surprisingly few
constitutional challenges. Those idyllic days are over. After two federal
4
courts of appeals cases upheld DNA-BC laws, two state supreme court
5
opinions gutted similar ones. In response, the Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court promptly stayed the judgment of Maryland’s highest court,
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Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, School of Law; Graduate Faculty
Member, Forensic Science Program, The Pennsylvania State University. I am grateful to
David Blankfein-Tabachnick, Kit Kinports, and David Witherspoon for comments on a
draft of this article and to David Housman, Robert Nussbaum, Kenneth Weiss, and Greg
Wray for emails or conversations on the medical significance of the CODIS loci.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:609(A)(1) (1998).
DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm.
See, e.g., GENETIC SUSPECTS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING AND
DATABASING 153–287 (Richard Hindmarsh & Barbara Prainsack eds., 2010) (discussing
some international DNA collection procedures including procedures in Austria, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Australia).
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 686
F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1214 (9th
Cir. 2010), vacated as moot en banc, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 483 (Ariz. 2012); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552–53
(Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). For a review of
earlier cases, see Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 475, 475–76 (2010). A more complete list of the cases can be found at D.H. Kaye, The
Constitutionality of DNA Collection Before Conviction: An Updated Scorecard, FORENSIC SCI.,
STATISTICS & THE LAW (Mar. 30, 2013), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2012/11/
the-constitionality-of-dna-collection.html [hereinafter Kaye, Scorecard].
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stating that “there is a fair prospect” that the full Court will follow the
6
“considered analysis” of the courts that have upheld the practice. A writ of
certiorari followed, and Maryland v. King is on the docket.
This Article argues that whether it chooses to endorse, limit, or entirely
disallow DNA-BC, the Court should reject the mode of analysis that all the
lower courts have followed. These courts have forsaken the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in favor of a direct form of
balancing. This choice of doctrine has been made possible by the Supreme
Court’s vacillation on whether and when the warrant requirement (subject
to narrowly drawn, categorical exceptions) applies. It is not too late to
repair this fracture in Fourth Amendment doctrine. This Article describes a
7
more principled, “biometric exception” to the warrant requirement. This
exception not only unifies the law on police acquisition of fingerprints,
photographs, and, now, DNA profiles, but it also strikes a reasonable balance
between individual interests in personal security and privacy and the
government’s interests in personal identifiers that are valuable for law
enforcement and other purposes.
After arguing for this categorical mode of analysis, I suggest that the
proposed exception to collecting and storing DNA profiles before
conviction supports at least some forms of DNA-BC. This conclusion is
contestable, of course, but the analysis that leads to it generates a map of all
the possible routes—and the obstacles along these routes—to a sound
conclusion about the constitutionality of DNA sampling on arrest. The
voyage also takes us into a large and often dimly understood realm of Fourth
Amendment law with its three related balancing tests—totality, specialneeds, and exception-defining balancing. And, it takes us into the heart of
the analogy drawn by many prosecutors and courts between DNA profiling
and fingerprinting.
The voyage proceeds in four stages. Part I describes the two major law
enforcement uses of biometric records, which I call authentication and
intelligence. Here, I argue that compulsory collection and recording of at
least some of these identifiers during booking is justified to maintain a

6
7

Maryland v. King, 113 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2012) (order granting stay pending the disposition of
the petition for a writ of certiorari).
For precursors of this proposal, see D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on
Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 498–504 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Arrest]; D.H.
Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric
Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188, 192–95 (2006) [hereinafter Kaye, Special
Needs]. Although the state noted this possible exception in its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 13 n.5, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207), neither it nor
the United States chose to rely on it. Indeed, at oral argument the Deputy Solicitor
General expressly disavowed “asking for a new exception.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 26, King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-207).
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durable record of individual identity. Part II examines opinions on the use
of these records not merely for biometric authentication, but for trawling
databases for matches to crime-scene DNA samples. The rise of criminal
intelligence databases has propelled some courts down different paths in a
headlong rush that brings to mind Yogi Berra’s advice about what do when
8
faced with a fork in the road—“Take it!” Parts II and III mark the locations
of these forks and indicate why some of them should not be taken. Part IV
discusses the content of the balancing that ultimately must determine the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the criminal intelligence databases.
It presents the case for a new exception to the warrant requirement and
applies the exception to fingerprinting and DNA profiling. It shows that the
similarities between the two types of biological data are greater than is
generally appreciated and suggests that the biometric exception permits at
least some systems of acquisition and use of both fingerprints and DNA
profiles for criminal intelligence databases.

I. THE TWO FUNCTIONS OF BIOMETRIC DATABASES
A. Authentication
The Supreme Court has never explicitly approved of routine
photographing, fingerprinting, or genotyping to establish and record the
identities of prisoners. For the better part of the last century, however, most
lower courts have accepted the propriety of taking and maintaining
collections of photographs and fingerprints on the ground that the impact
on individual liberty, reputation, and property is minor in comparison with
9
the value of establishing the true identity of an individual. These biometric
records can serve many purposes. By thwarting people from assuming false
identities, they give jailers information about the dangerousness of the
people they must confine; they supply prosecutors with information relevant
to charging decisions and trial strategy; they facilitate prosecutions for the

8
9

YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT!: INSPIRATION AND
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL’S GREATEST HEROES (2001).
See Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 485–86 (discussing the “true identity” exception). A
leading case is United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932). According to Wayne A.
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1580 (2012), judicial attitudes suddenly
shifted in the 1930s from a general refusal to allow the acquisition and retention of
photographs and other identifying information to “a less critical and more accepting
view.” My own review of the most significant appellate opinions from 1900 1932
indicates that a majority of courts upheld the practices of the police in these matters,
although the power to retain records after an acquittal was not clear even under Kelly.
D.H. Kaye, The Judicial Reception of Acquiring Biometric Data on Arrest: Photographing, Sizing,
and Fingerprinting Before 1933, FORENSIC SCI., STATISTICS & THE LAW (Dec. 25, 2012),
http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2012/12/the-judicial-reception-of-acquiring.html.

1098

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:4

crime of escape, and they enable pretrial release and sentencing decisions to
be based on an offender’s actual record. In addition, they can assist in
background checks of job applicants and in the identification of remains in
mass disasters or more isolated cases of missing persons.
Arguments against permanent records to authenticate claims of identity
are weak. To be sure, there is an American tradition that resists national
identity cards, but fingerprints, visible bodily characteristics, and nucleotide
base pairs are natural features whose production makes no significant
demands on the individual. Likewise, a claim of a right to effect a break in
one’s social identity would be hard to maintain. Knowing other people’s
identities does not demean human dignity and worth, but rather is an
important part of social interactions. There may be something appealing
about frontier days, when determined men and women could bury their past
and prove their worth with an assumed name in a new land, but this option
10
is mostly the subject of nostalgia and movie-making.
Because there is no right to a discontinuous identity, the case against
persistent records of individual identity must rest on a claim that the
acquisition, maintenance, or use of the records burdens some other rights
or interests. If the acquisition of a biometric identifier is minimally invasive
and the only use of the records is establishing actual identity, however, such
claims are implausible if not vacuous. A database, used solely to discern a
person’s true identity when the individual is legitimately in custody, should
be acceptable under a simple, if previously unarticulated, exception to the
usual Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant based on probable
cause. It also can be justified under the more amorphous “special needs” or
11
“administrative search” doctrine invoked by many courts to support post12
conviction DNA sampling.
Before elaborating on the appropriate legal
analysis, however, it is important to distinguish a second use of databases—
generating intelligence for criminal investigations. This use implicates
different individual interests and requires further justification.

10

11
12

D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the
Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 447 (2003) (discussing
“[t]emporal anonymity”). Cf. JOHN GRISHAM, THE PARTNER (1997) (depicting the travails
of assuming a new identity). Anonymity for specific purposes, such as making donations
or whistleblowing, may have greater value.
See infra Part II.
E.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (following earlier cases that
applied the special-needs test to uphold the constitutionality of DNA database laws);
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding a Wisconsin statute under
the “special-needs” doctrine); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Vt. 2008) (discussing
the “special-needs” doctrine and its use in previous cases).
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B. Intelligence
A biometric database advances the objectives of the criminal justice
system not only by enabling authentication of personal identity, but also by
associating suspected or even unknown perpetrators to their crimes through
physical traces such as fingerprints and DNA. Although the latter use of
13
fingerprint databases predates electronic computers, the FBI’s Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”) contains digitalized
14
images from over sixty-four million individuals. Parts of this database and
various state fingerprint databases are routinely searched for criminal
background checks and to yield short lists of possible matches to latent
prints recovered from crime scenes. A conservative estimate for the annual
number of “hits” between crime scene prints and the prints in databases is
15
50,000.
DNA profiles are more easily searched for unequivocal matches to crime
scene samples. By November 2012, the voracious national DNA database,
fed by records from state and federal DNA typing laboratories, contained
“over 10,043,800 offender profiles, 1,307,300 arrestee profiles and 461,900
forensic profiles” and had “produced over 195,600 hits assisting in more
16
than 187,700 investigations.”
For both fingerprints and DNA, however,
there are no statistics that show how much the database hits contributed to
17
investigation or convictions, let alone the extent of their deterrent effect

13

14
15
16
17

Kenneth R. Moses et al., Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), in THE
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 6-1, 6-4 (Alan McRoberts & Debbie McRoberts eds., 2011),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf. This history is discussed
infra Part III.A.
Id. at 6-12.
The estimate is for 2005. Id. at 6-11.
CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last
updated Nov. 2012).
See JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CORP., CENTER ON QUALITY POLICING, TOWARD A
COMPARISON OF DNA PROFILING AND DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 17
(2010) (explaining that data on whether a hit resulted in an offender being apprehended
and prosecuted would help improve the criminal justice system); Frederick R. Bieber,
Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Data Bank
Programs, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 227 (2006) (noting the lack of data on the outcomes
of the “hits”). But see H. Brevy Cannon, First Cost-Benefit Analysis of DNA Profiling Vindicates
‘CSI’ Fans, UVA TODAY (Jan. 10, 2013), https://news.virginia.edu/content/first-costbenefit-analysis-dna-profiling-vindicates-csi-fans (“The first rigorous analysis of the crimefighting power of DNA profiling finds substantial evidence of its effectiveness.”); JOHN K.
ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE DNA FIELD EXPERIMENT: COST-EFFECTIVENESS
ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DNA IN THE INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-VOLUME CRIMES 147 (2008)
(“Property crime cases where DNA evidence is processed had twice as many suspects
identified, twice as many suspects arrested, and more than twice as many cases accepted
for prosecution as compared to traditional investigation; DNA was at least five times as
likely to result in a suspect identification compared to fingerprints; [s]uspects identified
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18

on future offenders or offenses. The lack of definitive data on the benefits
of arrestee databasing makes it difficult to judge the extent to which early
acquisition of DNA samples saves lives and prevents crime. Although there
19
have been many hits to arrestee DNA, we do not know how many of these
arrestees later were convicted of a database-eligible crime anyway. Neither
do we know the impact of the delay in waiting for such convictions. All we
can say is that between arrests and trials, there will be some number of arrestees released pending trial who will commit additional crimes, and there
will some cases in which evidence about other DNA-related crimes will be
destroyed or lost.
Unfortunately, in upholding convicted-offender DNA databases and,
implicitly, fingerprint databases, several courts have elided authentication
(true identity) and intelligence (identification of crime scene samples) uses
of the databases by speaking of “identity” or “identification” in an
20
undifferentiated sense. This confusion seems to have originated in Jones v.
21
Murray, the first court of appeals case to uphold the constitutionality of a
DNA database. There, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim
privacy in it. . . . [T]he identification of suspects is relevant not only to
solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes.
This becomes readily apparent when we consider the universal
approbation of “booking” procedures that are followed for every suspect
arrested for a felony, whether or not the proof of a particular suspect’s
crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification. Thus a tax evader
is fingerprinted just the same as is a burglar. . . . As with fingerprinting,

18

19

20
21

by DNA had at least twice as many prior felony arrests and convictions as those identified
by traditional investigation.”).
Some indications of specific deterrence can be found in interviews with convicted
offenders. Barbara Prainsack, Partners in Crime: The Use of Forensic DNA Technologies in
Austria 153, in GENETIC SUSPECTS, supra note 3, at 169 71. An observational “multiple
clock” study of Florida data attempted to separate the effect of specific deterrence from
incapacitation. The statistical analysis revealed only a small reduction in recidivism
(within three years of release) for individuals convicted of certain crimes. AVINASH
BHATI, URBAN INSTITUTE, QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DNA
DATABASES 34 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412058. At best,
however, this study measured only the marginal specific deterrent effect (after conviction
and release) of being included in a database. It did not address the deterrent effect on
first-time arrestees.
For example, Virginia reports a total of 790 hits to the arrestee database from its
establishment in 2003 through October 31, 2012. Of these, 117 were associated with
sexual assault cases.
DNA Databank Statistics, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI.,
http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/statistics/index.cfm (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
E.g., People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65 (Cal. 2010) (“[I]ndividuals in lawful custody
cannot claim privacy in their identification.”).
962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
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therefore, we find that the Fourth Amendment does not require an
additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be taken
22
from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.

The fallacy is that fingerprinting on arrest received “universal approbation”
because it provided an excellent, permanent record of a person’s true
23
identity—it was extremely valuable for authentication.
Until relatively
recently, an arrestee’s fingerprints were not generally “a permanent record
24
to solve past and future crimes.”
This separate intelligence function
demanded huge computers and pattern-recognition software. Because
there is no single “purpose of identifying” arrestees, a more precise analysis
is necessary. Part II begins the task of describing the appropriate conceptual
framework for assessing the constitutionality of “a permanent record”
maintained either for authenticating an identity, for intelligence gathering,
or for both purposes.

II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Classifying and Balancing
25

The Fourth Amendment protects personal security with two parallel
clauses:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
26
the persons or things to be seized.
The first clause bars unreasonable searches and seizures; the second
requires that warrants be based on probable cause. But, the Amendment is

22
23
24

25

26

Id. at 306 07.
See infra Part III.A (recounting this history).
A number of courts, however, approved of the acquisition or use of arrestee photographs
in investigations and trials. See Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417, 426 (D.C. Cir.
1904) (rejecting as “fanciful” the defendant’s objection to the use of his arrest
photograph, in which he had no beard, to help a witness identify him at trial, when he
had a beard, on the ground that the state had no right to photograph him for that
purpose); Mabry v. Kettering, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (Ark. 1909) (holding that men charged
with state crimes and held in a county jail were not entitled to an injunction to prevent
their jailers from giving their photographs to federal officials “for the purpose of
identifying appellants in the various localities where [federal] offenses are charged to
have been committed”).
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the core
value of the Fourth Amendment is the interest in personal security rather than the
privacy of information).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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silent on how the two clauses interact, the historical record is “foggy,” and
29
the scholarly literature is divided.
Opinions of the Supreme Court reflect this ambiguity. At times, the
Court has suggested that reasonableness can be determined by inquiring
30
into the totality of the circumstances in each case. More often, however,
the Court determines reasonableness by invoking a general and
31
32
“prevailing” rule that searches require warrants, then looking through a
33
pragmatic collection of categorical exceptions to this stringent demand.
27

28
29

30

31
32

33

Competing theories are described in Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams,
His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1061 (2011) (rejecting the notion that
the amendment was “designed solely to ban general warrants”) and Cynthia Lee, Package
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the
Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1404 (2010) (arguing the
tolerance of warrantless container searches demonstrates the “gradual embrace of the
Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment”).
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1969).
See David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to Early DNA
Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 15 16 nn.71 72 (2012) [hereinafter Kaye,
Drawing Lines] (citing some of the contentious writings).
E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“Courts must consider the scope of the
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it,
and the place in which it is conducted.”). Cf. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
299 300 (1999) (“Where [historical] inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the
search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 53 (1995) (“At least . . . where there
was no clear practice . . . at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a
particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its intrusion
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted)). For a
criticism of the theory of “constitutionalized common law,” see David A. Sklansky, The
Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1808 (2000).
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974).
E.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“It is a basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law, we have often said, that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[A]s a general matter, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967))); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth Amendment
proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”).
On the development of this approach of classification rather than balancing, see, for
example, Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away:
The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
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34

For instance, in Cupp v. Murphy, the Court held that scraping material from
under an arrestee’s fingernails without first securing a warrant was
reasonable—but only because it fell into a previously accepted category of
35
warrantless searches “incident to a valid arrest.”
This incident-to-arrest
exception is based on the premise that arresting officers often need to act
36
quickly to preserve evidence or to protect themselves.
Categorical exceptions are the result of a prior balancing of such factors
as the feasibility or value of securing a warrant, the extent and nature of the
invasion of privacy, the purpose of the search, and the likelihood that it will
achieve its goal. But this pre-exception balancing occurs at the level of
defining the rule rather than applying it to the facts of a specific case. In
other words, the creation of exceptions to the warrant requirement is a
species of standards-based reasoning that entails the balancing of a defined
37
range of competing considerations. Its purpose is to generate a framework
of exceptions that do not permit direct appeals to the factors used to create
the more specific rules.
Constraining courts to a rule-based system can provide greater accuracy
and predictability in judicial decisionmaking than that which would flow
38
from direct balancing in every case. Of course, if all judges and lawyers
39
were like Ronald Dworkin’s Judge Hercules, the rules for warrantless
searches would be unnecessarily restrictive and unwise. Direct appeals to
reasonableness would resolve the cases correctly. But, in the real world of

34
35
36

37

38

39

CRIMINOLOGY 933 (2010). Some of the ebb and flow, as it pertains to DNA database laws,
is noted infra Part III.
412 U.S. 291 (1973).
Id. at 295.
Consequently, the exception does not justify DNA collection. In Cupp, defendant had
placed his hands behind his back, then into his pockets, and a metallic sound, such as
keys or change rattling, was heard. Id. at 296. “The rationale of Chimel [v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969)], in these circumstances, justified the police in subjecting him to the very
limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his
fingernails.” Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296. Recognizing that “[t]he Court’s search incident to
arrest cases have been bottomed on different justifications,” the Department of Justice
did not take the position, suggested by Justice Kennedy in the oral argument in King, that
Maryland (and federal) law merely was implementing “a search incident to an arrest” that
was “just like taking the pockets out and—and seeing what’s in the person’s overcoat and
so forth.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 26–27.
On the distinction between rules and standards, see, for example, Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 611
(1992) (arguing that predictability will be enhanced if “precedent transforms standards
into rules”).
In Dworkin’s coherence theory of law, Hercules was an ideal judge endowed with infinite
patience and resourcefulness. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083
(1975).
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limited capacities and cognitive resources, and a hindsight bias that
40
encourages courts to admit the fruits of successful searches, confining
discretion to a suitable set of well-defined but imperfect rules is superior to
41
ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances balancing in every case.
Therefore,
regardless of the historical and textual arguments about the primacy of the
warrant requirement, the requirement is justifiable on pragmatic grounds.
It reflects the judgment that in classical search cases—physical invasions of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” of members of the general public to
generate evidence of crime or recover contraband—the balance of
individual and state interests favors the individual whose security should not
depend on the unchecked power of the police. Rather, the police should
have to establish, to the satisfaction of a neutral magistrate, that they have
probable cause to justify subjecting individuals to the indignity,
inconvenience, and interference with liberty or property incident to a search
42
or seizure.
The task of the courts is not to re-evaluate this judgment, but merely to
ascertain whether the case falls into this canonical category or instead
involves a recognized set of circumstances captured in an exception to the
warrant requirement. If the case falls outside of all the exceptions, then the
court must deem the search unconstitutional—unless, of course, the court
can establish a new, limited exception by applying the principles and
43
standards governing the recognition of exceptions.
The next section examines how the lower courts have applied this
framework—and departed from it—in DNA database cases. Importantly,
40

41
42
43

But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight 1–5 (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory Research Series, Paper No. 11-25, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877125 (finding that the hindsight bias influenced
“judges’ assessments of the likely outcome of a search. . . . but [it] does not influence
their legal rulings”).
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (1987)
(defending older common law tort rules over ad hoc balancing of risk and utility).
For a contemporary defense of the value of warrants, see Oren Bar-Gill & Barry
Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2012).
If the scope of the exceptions is too large and their outcomes are too unpredictable, then
the warrant requirement, as applied through a system of categorical exceptions, will not
have the desired effect of protecting personal security from arbitrary police action. To
avoid this situation, the destabilizing exceptions could be constricted by requiring
warrants in all situations in which it is practical and useful to obtain them. See id. at
1657 63 (proposing revamping the warrant requirement in this manner). This
modification of existing law is appealing, but it would have no impact on the
constitutionality of warrantless data collection from all arrestees. Either acquisition of
biometric data from arrestees who are legitimately in custody is reasonable across the
board or it is not. Arrest warrants would be desirable to ensure that the detention is
legitimate in the first instance, but once someone validly is in custody, all that the
revamped warrant requirement advocated by Bar-Gill and Friedman demands is that the
data collection be applied uniformly to well-defined classes of arrestees.
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the sole established categorical exception that might justify taking DNA on
arrest is the “special needs” exception. It triggers a balancing test for
reasonableness, but it is still part of the framework of predefined exceptions
to the warrant requirement and is not arbitrarily available. The courts, both
federal and state, have split on whether DNA databases assembled after
44
convictions (“DNA-AC”) are eligible for the special-needs exception. To
clarify the scope of the exception, I propose a “special interests” theory to
show that the exception does not reach the warrantless acquisition of
information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy solely to
build a criminal intelligence database to identify the perpetrators of past or
future crimes. It should apply, however, to databases that are strictly for
authentication—and to those that serve both functions. Because fingerprint
databases clearly are multipurpose in operation, they can be analyzed under
the special needs exception, so construed. DNA databases, however, are
closer to pure intelligence databases, making the applicability of the specialneeds exception more problematic.
The DNA-BC (Before Conviction) cases have rejected special-needs
balancing but arrived at the same endpoint by moving directly to totality-of45
the-circumstances balancing. Resort to this ad hoc balancing poisons the
healthy framework of using defined exceptions. The next section shows that
totality balancing is consistent with only a small number of anomalous
Supreme Court cases. Yet if neither special-needs balancing nor totality
balancing can be used to justify arrestee DNA sampling (when its sole
purpose is to construct and operate a criminal-intelligence DNA database),
it might seem that the minority of courts condemning DNA-BC are correct.
This conclusion, however, is too hasty. Both fingerprint and DNA databases
should be eligible for a biometric exception that the courts, in their zeal to
46
balance directly, have overlooked.
Before describing and applying this
exception, an exposition of the debate in the DNA-BC cases over the
grounds for balancing is in order.

B. The Conflict over Special-Needs and Direct Balancing in the Arrestee Cases
1. A Preliminary Point
The cases on arrestee DNA sampling agree on one preliminary matter—
penetrating the surface of the body to extract a blood sample or reaching

44
45
46

See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.
David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting DNA Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 104 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, Considered Analysis] (describing the
leading cases).
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inside the cheek to scrape away epithelial cells is a search of the person.
47
Indeed, two Supreme Court opinions clearly support this consensus.
However, there is a plausible argument that taking cells for DNA analysis by
having an arrestee spit into a cup or place his fingers on a sticky pad would
48
not be a search, and some courts have held that the process of recording
fingerprints (as distinguished from detaining a person for this purpose)
49
does not amount to a search of the person. Furthermore, case law holds
that collecting the samples from items or bodily material that the person in
50
custody has discarded or shed is not a search or seizure. However, I shall
not pursue these arguments for upholding external or surreptitious DNA
sampling here. Elsewhere, I have given reasons to conclude that removing

47

48

49

50

See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scraping material from under a fingernail);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (extracting blood for alcohol testing). Cf.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (collecting urine for alcohol and
drug testing is not a physical intrusion but is still considered a search because of the
manner of collection and the information content). Several courts have used the term
“seizure” to describe the act of acquiring the cells from an individual who already is
detained, but this is difficult to reconcile with the normal definition of a Fourth
Amendment seizure. See Kaye, Considered Analysis, supra note 46, at 111 (defining a
seizure as “depr[ivation] of the possession of property or prevent[ing] an individual from
moving away”).
Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 480 (discussing critically the emphasis on bodily integrity in
the case law); Justin A. Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection
Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1030 33 (2005)
(discussing technological advances in DNA collection that may render the “intrusiveness
paradigm irrelevant”). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp.
2d 159, 165 (D.N.H. 1998) (“[A] grand jury subpoena compelling a citizen to provide
saliva samples does implicate his or her Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v.
Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the collection of a saliva sample to
be a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vikers, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (“Fourth
Amendment rights are not implicated by the grand jury’s request for fingerprints.”);
Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 82 (D. Alaska 1994) (concluding that the
requirement to appear for fingerprinting as part of sex offender registration is a seizure,
but fingerprinting itself is probably not a search); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 386 n.8
(N.J. 1995) (“[B]ecause plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
fingerprints [or] photograph . . . the requirement to provide such information . . . does
not constitute a search.”).
When no bodily invasion occurs—when DNA is shed or deposited naturally, or even
acquired by deceit—courts have not perceived the reasonable expectation of privacy that
defines a search under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). E.g., Williamson v. State,
993 A.2d 626, 630, 641 (Md. 2010) (retrieving a McDonald’s cup after a detainee ate
dinner did not require a warrant); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007)
(affirming conviction of a suspect who had not been arrested but tricked into mailing a
letter with his saliva on the envelope to the police); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried &
D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 436 40 (2001)
(discussing police acquisition of DNA from inadvertently abandoned cells). But see
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012) (treating a laboratory analysis of a
lawfully acquired sample as a search).
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cells from the exterior of the body is still a search, and the shed-DNA
52
approach is not terribly practical for building a large arrestee database.
Of course, merely classifying DNA sampling and fingerprinting of
arrestees as searches does not make them constitutionally unreasonable.
Most courts have upheld DNA-BC after balancing individual and state
53
interests, but several give no reason for their balancing test (beyond the
fact that some form of balancing has been used in other DNA database cases
54
or in other contexts, or that the parties did not question it).

2. Choosing Between Special-Needs and Direct Balancing
55

At this point, the leading DNA-BC case is United States v. Mitchell. A
federal grand jury indicted Ruben Mitchell in 2009 for possession of cocaine
56
with intent to distribute.
The government sought a DNA sample at the
57
initial appearance, but Mitchell objected on constitutional grounds. The
district court declared that the federal law providing for pretrial DNA
58
collection and inclusion in the national database was unconstitutional.
The Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and also skipped over a
59
normal three-judge panel to hear the case en banc. Over the objections of
60
nearly a third of the court, it reversed.
The district court had applied the direct balancing test to strike down
61
62
the law. The court of appeals applied the same test to uphold it. Neither
court successfully justified the choice of the test in the first place. The
district court discussed the conflicting views expressed in convicted-offender
63
cases with respect to the doctrinal basis for balancing. In “special-needs
64
and administrative-search cases”
51
52

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 480 81 (noting the importance of the nature of the
information obtained from the cells).
D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62, 62 63 (2006)
[hereinafter, Kaye, Science Fiction] (questioning the ability of already backlogged labs and
burdened police forces to compile a large database from shed DNA).
See Kaye, Scorecard, supra note 5 (collecting cases).
See Kaye, Considered Analysis, supra note 46, at 114 17 (criticizing the limited analysis in
three such cases).
652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 389.
United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
Id. at 611 (declaring that 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) violates the Fourth Amendment).
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 391.
Id. at 416.
Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 606 10.
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403 (“[W]e . . . apply the totality of the circumstances test to the
present challenge to the latest iteration of the DNA Act.”).
See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (describing the division within the federal circuits on
“special-needs” and “totality” balancing) (citations omitted).
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 81 (2011).
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A judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where the search
or seizure is justified by “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,” such as the need to deter drug use in public schools . . . or
the need to assure that railroad employees engaged in train operations
are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol . . . and where the search
or seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant authorizing, for
example, an inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause
. . . or an inspection of residential premises to assure compliance with a
65
housing code.

Police agencies also can conduct such warrantless, suspicionless searches, as
in (1) stops for questioning or observation at a fixed Border Patrol
66
67
checkpoint, a sobriety checkpoint, or a checkpoint to question drivers
68
about a recent hit-and-run accident; (2) inspections and seizures for the
69
purpose of inventorying and preserving an arrestee’s possessions; (3)
70
random “shakedown” searches of prison cells; and (4) even visual anal or
71
vaginal examinations of pretrial detainees.
In these kinds of cases, the
court must first identify the special need for the administrative or other
search and then ensure that the government’s interests in searching
outweigh the individual interests in being free from the intrusion.
Quoting from a dissenting opinion in an en banc Ninth Circuit DNA-AC
case, the Mitchell district court decided that the special-needs exception
could not apply because “[t]he unequivocal purpose of the searches
65
66

67

68

69

70

71

Id. at 2081 (citations omitted).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 50, 566 67 (1976) (approving
warrantless searches at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint near the U.S.-Mexico
border).
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (“[T]he balance of the State’s
interest in preventing drunken driving, the to which this system can reasonably be said to
advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are
briefly stopped, weights in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”).
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 27 (2004) (noting the minimal interference to the
public and the grave public concern involved with assisting police in their criminal
investigation and suggesting practical considerations of limited police resources and
community hostility to traffic delays will restrain proliferation of such investigations).
Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (“A range of governmental interests supports an inventory process.”); cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (upholding an extensive inventory search of an impounded car and its contents as an instance of
“police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents
within police custody”).
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (declaring sweepingly that “the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the
confines of the prison cell”).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 60 (1979) (describing searches deemed “not
unreasonable” after “[b]alancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the
[detention facility] against the privacy interests of the [detainees]”); cf. Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (holding as constitutional a warrantless search of
probationer’s home with “reasonable grounds”).
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performed pursuant to the DNA Act is to generate the sort of ordinary
investigatory evidence used by law enforcement officials for everyday law
72
enforcement purposes.” The Third Circuit agreed, observing that it (and
most other circuits) already had rejected the special-needs exception in
73
favor of direct balancing in DNA-AC cases. But rather than identify any
principled basis for departing from the warrant requirement, the Third
Circuit blandly—but dangerously—presented totality balancing as applying
to Fourth Amendment cases without limit. It wrote that balancing is “the
key principle of the Fourth Amendment” and is “the general Fourth
74
Amendment approach.”
So much for the extended (though not
unbroken) line of Supreme Court cases spanning many decades and
expressing “the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence” that
warrantless searches not subject to categorical exceptions are “per se
75
unreasonable.”
Unfortunately, even efforts such as the district court’s, to distinguish
between “ordinary investigatory evidence” and other kinds of investigatory
76
evidence, are frustratingly inconclusive. Consider Illinois v. Lidster.
Just
after midnight on a Saturday, a vehicle struck and killed a seventy-year-old
bicyclist. The motorist drove off without identifying himself. About one
week later, local police established a midnight highway checkpoint where
the fatal collision occurred. Police cars with flashing lights forced traffic to
stop so that an officer could ask the occupants whether they had seen
anything happen there the previous weekend and distribute a flyer seeking
assistance in the investigation.
As Robert Lidster approached the
checkpoint in his minivan, he swerved, nearly hitting an officer who later
smelled alcohol on Lidster’s breath. “Lidster was tried and convicted in
77
Illinois state court of driving under the influence of alcohol.”
The trial court rejected Lidster’s claim that the checkpoint stop violated
the Fourth Amendment. An Illinois appellate court and the Illinois
Supreme Court determined that the warrantless, suspicionless law
enforcement checkpoint did not advance a special need and therefore was

72
73
74

75
76
77

United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 855 56 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the totality-ofcircumstances test as the appropriate mode of analysis).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Misreading Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977), the Ninth Circuit leapt to the same conclusion in Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir.2012), reh’g en banc granted and opinions vacated, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 25 (1982).
540 U.S. 419 (2004).
Id. at 422.
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78

The United States Supreme Court unanimously
unconstitutional.
reversed, reasoning that stopping all drivers at a particular time and place to
learn the identity of the perpetrator of the unsolved crime was an
79
“information-seeking kind of stop” within the scope of the special-needs
80
81
exception. One can read the case—as the Second Circuit has —to imply
that an information-seeking kind of database also is subject to special-needs
balancing. As in Lidster, the police are asking a subset of the public for
information that could help them in unsolved cases with no clear “suspicion,
82
or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.”
Alternatively, one can distinguish Lidster from DNA-BC on the ground
that the police in Lidster were not seeking to gather evidence on Lidster
83
himself. In contrast, the criminal-intelligence rationale for DNA-BC is that
a database trawl might link the very arrestee who must submit to DNA
sampling to a past crime or implicate him in a future one. But this merely
84
illustrates that phrases like “crime control,” “evidence of ordinary criminal
85
86
wrongdoing,” “everyday law enforcement purposes,” and “ordinary
87
investigatory evidence” are not sure boundary markers. Lidster makes it
plain that some law enforcement investigative practices are special-needs,
and many lower courts have held that as long as the police are not seeking
evidence of a suspect’s involvement in a specific crime that is still under
88
investigation, they are engaging in a special-needs search.
Indeed, in
78
79
80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 422 23.
Id. at 424.
Justice Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented as to the disposition of the case. They
suggested that “the outcome of the multifactor test . . . is by no means clear on the facts”
and they therefore would have remanded to the state courts to consider the outcome of
the balancing test in the first instance. Id. at 429.
United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the collection of
DNA samples to create a DNA index qualifies as a special need).
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004).
See id. at 423 (“The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not
the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.”).
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000).
Id.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id.
E.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668 69 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find it crucial that
the state, in collecting DNA samples, is not trying to determine that a particular
individual has engaged in some wrongdoing” (internal quotation marks omitted));
People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 91 (Ill. 2006) (determining that a DNA sample “does
not, on its own, show the commission of a crime” and so is distinct “from the normal
need for law enforcement”); Petitioner F v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 89 90 (Ky. 2010)
(finding that the government’s DNA sample collecting was not “for the immediate and
sole purpose of collecting incriminating evidence” and thus it “fulfill[ed] a special need”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 279 (N.J. 2007)
(determining that a special need was present because of the impracticality of requiring
individualized suspicion before obtaining a DNA sample of a convicted felon and because
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upholding the detainee provisions of the federal database law, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of New York applied the Second
89
Circuit’s no-specific-investigation rationale.
To evaluate whether the special-needs exception extends to the
intelligence function of DNA databases, we need something more revealing
than the verbal formulae used to describe the types of searches embraced as
“special” or “administrative” in the past. We need an understanding of why
the category exists. The evocative phrase “special needs” first appeared in
90
1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O. A high school teacher brought two students
she had found smoking in the lavatory to the principal’s office. The
assistant vice-principal searched the purse of one of the two, who denied the
accusation, and discovered cigarettes and marijuana. Citing an apparently
disparate array of cases that permitted searches without warrants or probable
cause, the Court sought to “strike the balance between the schoolchild’s
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to
91
maintain an environment in which learning can take place.” To this end, it
dismissed “[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, [as] unsuited to the
school environment [because it] would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in
the schools,” and it reduced “the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed
92
to justify a search” from probable cause to reasonable suspicion “under all
93
the circumstances.”
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, contained passages that
could be read to say that direct balancing is permissible in almost any kind
94
of case.
Seeking to cabin the resort to balancing, Justice Blackmun

89
90

91
92
93
94

the testing was not for the immediate investigation of a specific crime); State v. Martin,
955 A.2d 1144, 1153 (Vt. 2008) (upholding DNA sampling because the goals of the
program were “beyond the normal goals of law enforcement”); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d
1076, 1085 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (finding that the “drawing of blood from convicted
felons to establish a DNA bank for use in future prosecution of recidivist acts does not
violate the Fourth Amendment” because it is a deterrent and thus not “normal” law
enforcement).
United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172 CJS, 2011 WL 1627321 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27,
2011), appeal pending.
469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985) (describing the “middle position” of the “majority of courts”
to have been that “the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the
legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause”).
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 341 (“[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”).
Id. at 337, 340, 341.
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He
expanded on the phrase “special needs” in a concurring opinion.
observed that “we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly
applying the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only
when we were confronted with a special law enforcement need for greater
96
flexibility.”
The reason for something “special,” Justice Blackmun
explained, is that “the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of
most searches to the judgment of courts or government officers; the framers
of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a
search is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on
97
probable cause.”
Only when venturing outside the realm of “most
searches” should the Court strike its own balance. The boundary between
ordinary searches (for which the framers had done the balancing) and the
special situations (that justified contemporary balancing) is to be found in
“those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
98
requirement impracticable.”
Then and only then “is a court entitled to
99
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the [f]ramers.”
Justice Blackmun’s effort to confine “the balancing test” to a defined
100
category of cases is an improvement over the majority’s generalities, but it
goes too far. It would have been more apt to speak of special interests rather
than special needs. A court should never “substitute its balancing of interests
101
for that of the [f]ramers.”
Rather, a special interest creates a special
need—because that interest was not factored into the original balancing.
Therefore, the court should be allowed to do its own balancing in one
bounded category of cases—those in which the interests differ in type from

95

96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 332 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he special needs of the school
environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less
exacting than that of probable cause.”).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 496 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 351. One can object that Justice Blackmun’s reference to an original balancing
performed by the Framers is bad history. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (contending that the Fourth
Amendment was originally understood only to set warrant standards); David E. Steinberg,
The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 584 (2008)
(“[N]either the warrant preference rule nor the global reasonableness requirement
receive support from Fourth Amendment history.”). The history is the subject of
continuing debate. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 42, at 1613; see also authorities
cited, supra note 29. But even if this view is correct, the concept of prior balancing
producing a warrant requirement subject to categorical exceptions (one of which entails
balancing) has pragmatic value in the administration of search and seizure law. See supra
Part I.
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the canonical ones for which warrants and probable cause are necessary.
These exceptional cases are usually, but not always, distinct from the ones
that merely enforce the criminal law. In T.L.O., maintaining order in the
schools added an interest that is not present in a classic search of a person,
property, or papers for evidence of violations of the criminal or revenue
laws. The balance previously struck and crystalized in the form of the
warrant requirement and its exceptions is appropriate for searches whose
sole function is to produce evidence of an individual’s criminal conduct to
be used in enforcing the law prohibiting that conduct. But it does not
necessarily fit a different set of interests. To avoid a wooden and
inappropriate form of Fourth Amendment analysis in this class of cases—but
only in this class of cases—a court needs to return to first principles in
judging reasonableness.
Moreover, contrary to Justice Blackmun’s formulation, the class of
special-interest cases is not coextensive with those for which warrants and
probable cause are impractical. Practicality is important in the balancing
stage of a true special-interest case. Impracticality indicates that the balance
favors the government. For example, a sobriety checkpoint furthers the
special interest of removing impaired drivers from the roads regardless of
subsequent criminal proceedings. This justifies special-interest balancing—
because in addition to the normal interest in catching and punishing
criminals, the state has an immediate interest in clearing the roads of
103
dangerous drivers.
That a warrant based on individualized suspicion
makes it impossible to operate the checkpoint helps show that the program
is constitutionally reasonable—that the balance favors the government—but
it does not help in defining the class of cases for which reasonableness
balancing is appropriate.

102

103

This was not Justice Blackmun’s understanding of the “special needs” phrase that he
coined to unify a variegated set of cases and to prevent them from eviscerating the
warrant requirement. His conception of special needs explicitly encompassed “a special
law enforcement need for greater flexibility” as exemplified in the “limited ‘stop and
frisk’ upon less than probable cause” allowed in Terry v. Ohio. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351–52
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 21, 23 24 (1968)). Nonetheless, the requirement of
an interest beyond that of acquiring evidence against the target of the search is more
consistent with his emphasis on the Framer’s original balancing. The Ninth Circuit
employed this idea in Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009), which
condemned the forced acquisition of a detainee’s DNA that was not authorized by
statute. The Friedman panel wrote that “the ‘special needs’ exception applies only to nonlaw enforcement purposes.” Id. at 853. Unfortunately, this reformulation is too
restrictive. It is clear that the special-needs category encompasses some law enforcement
purposes, as in Lidster.
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 39 (2000) (describing the roadblocks in Sitz as “clearly aimed at reducing the
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways”).
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The difficulty with the articulation of the special-needs exception as
proposed in T.L.O. and extended since then is that it exceeds the set of
special-interests cases for which Justice Blackmun provided the rationale for
balancing. It also includes cases that merely involve the usual sets of
individual and government interests in criminal investigations. In these
cases, impracticality can be a reason to create an exception to the warrant or
probable cause requirements, as the Court has done for searches incident to
arrest, but it is not a reason to balance the same set of individual and
government interests any differently than the framers did. Likewise, when
the state’s intrusion is a lesser invasion of the interests of the affected
individuals, as in the case of a limited stop-and-frisk rather than a full-blown
arrest or search, a categorical exception to the warrant requirement is
appropriate. Again, these exceptions reflect a balancing process, but they
are not themselves instances of special-interests balancing, and describing
104
them as special-needs cases creates confusion.
Given the logic that underlies the special-needs exception, the
intelligence-gathering function should not be considered a special need. It
might be a wonderful way to catch criminals and to deter individuals from
certain crimes. It could constitute a lesser intrusion on individual interests.
It may be applied uniformly, without arbitrariness and abuse of power.
These are all good reasons to recognize a biometric exception to the
Warrant Clause as the defining feature of reasonableness as discussed in Part
105
IV, but they involve no major special interests beyond those that produce
106
the general rule against searches without warrants and probable cause.
104

105

106

For other efforts to impose more structure on the sprawling special-needs exception, see,
for example, Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 254, 257 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the LawAbiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 162–63 (1989).
Using a criminal intelligence database to check whether an arrestee is implicated in any
unsolved crimes can further at least one special interest: making a fully informed
determination as to whether or not an arrestee should be released before trial (and, if so,
under what special conditions). See infra Part IV.B. The uncertain law governing mixedmotive special-needs cases is discussed in Part III.
Cf. Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J.
843, 870 (2010) (remarking in passing that characterizing “taking [of] DNA samples as a
‘special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement’ . . . [is] a logically impossible
task because the DNA database being assembled [is] used for traditional law enforcement
purposes” (internal quotation omitted)). The conclusion is perhaps less clear than this.
One might say that the special-needs exception comes into play only when “police, and
even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of
obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings.” O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Taking DNA from a
convicted offender and retaining the resulting profile indefinitely puts the offender on
notice that he might be exposed in any future crimes. The specific-deterrence interest
applies even when the evidence-seeking one does not. Removing DNA profiles from the
database for lack of conviction, however, attenuates this special interest.
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Yet, in Mitchell and other DNA database cases, courts have balanced
107
The
under another name—the “Totality of the Circumstances Analysis.”
actual balancing in totality cases is no different from that in special-interest
cases—the court weighs the nature and furtherance of the government
interests against the intrusion on the interests protected by the Fourth
108
Amendment. The difference is what triggers the balancing. Special-needs
balancing, as we have seen, should require the presence of a non-law
enforcement interest or a special kind of law enforcement interest. Totality
balancing is just a reversion to the philosophy of balancing whenever it suits
the court—the very approach that Justice Blackmun decried in T.L.O., that
Justice Brennan, dissenting in that case, derided as dangerous and
109
incoherent, and that Justice Kagan recently described as atypical “free110
form balancing.”
Totality balancing became popular in DNA-AC cases following the
111
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Knights.
Convicted of a drug
offense, Mark James Knights was sentenced to summary probation “on the
condition: that Knights would ‘[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of
residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a
search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation
112
officer or law enforcement officer.’”
A detective, with ample reason to
suspect that Knights was involved in acts of vandalism and arson against the
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, entered Knight’s apartment without a
warrant.
There, he found “a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid
chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt
cutters, telephone pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and a brass
113
padlock stamped ‘PG&E.’”
Before trial for conspiracy and weapons
violations, Knights moved to suppress these items. The district court
granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. These courts relied on
107
108

109

110
111
112
113

United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
The Third Circuit has called the totality-of-the-circumstances test “more rigorous,” but it
did not identify the source or nature of the extra rigor. United States v. Sczubelek, 402
F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). Second Circuit opinions describe special-needs balancing
as “more rigorous,” but all they mean by this is that the government must demonstrate
the existence of a special interest to reach the balancing stage. See United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Use of such a
‘balancing test’ to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search
represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis [that] finds support
neither in precedent nor in policy and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens.”); id. at 369
(“[T]hese ‘balancing tests’ amount to . . . doctrinally destructive nihilism.”).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 25.
534 U.S. 112 (2001).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
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114

Griffin v. Wisconsin in which the Supreme Court had upheld warrantless
searches of probationers as justified under the special-needs exception
because they related to the operation of a state’s system for supervised
115
release of offenders.
In Knights, however, the search of the probationer’s
apartment was not intended to advance this special interest, and no other
exception to the warrant requirement applied. Therefore, the lower courts
held that the search was per se unreasonable.
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who had no sympathy for the established exception-based-warrant116
requirement approach, wrote a brief opinion for the Court stating that
“the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth
Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances,’ with
117
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.” The phrase
“totality of the circumstances” did not come from any case in which the
Court had substituted direct balancing for the better established exceptionbased approach. It came from the Chief Justice’s opinion several years
118
earlier, in Ohio v. Robinette.
Robinette concerned the voluntariness of a
119
defendant’s consent to a search. Determinations of consent to a search or
120
121
122
seizure,
probable
cause,
reasonable
suspicion,
exigent
123
124
circumstances, and excessive force are fact-intensive questions that turn
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

121

122

123

483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Id. at 876–77.
E.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting
“judicially created preference” for warrants).
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (citation omitted).
519 U.S. 33 (1996).
Id. at 35.
E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (“[T]o determine whether a particular
encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter.”).
E.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is
incapable of precise definition . . . because it deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of the circumstances.”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)(“[P]robable
cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”).
E.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (discussing how courts “must look
at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has
a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (explaining that to judge “what cause is sufficient to
authorize police to stop a person . . . the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture—must be taken into account”).
E.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (keeping an individual suspected of
having marijuana in a trailer from entering the trailer alone while officers applied for a
search warrant was reasonable under “the circumstances of the case before us”). But see
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (adopting a rule that “a warrant to search
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on the circumstances of the case. In these kinds of cases, a court must
consider all the factual circumstances—the totality of the circumstances—
125
Ripping the phrase
but it does not normally weigh two sets of interests.
out of context to describe or justify ad hoc balancing of interests, as the
Chief Justice did in Knights, is unpersuasive and destabilizing.
Four short years later, Justice Thomas picked up the ball that the Chief
126
Justice tossed in Knights. Writing for the Court in Samson v. California,
Thomas applied the same direct balancing test as if it were the “general
127
Fourth Amendment approach”
to permit a warrantless, suspicionless
128
search of a parolee that uncovered methamphetamine in his pocket. As in
Knights, it would have been difficult to rationalize the search in terms of the
state’s special interest in supervising released prisoners, and the majority in
Samson did not even try.
All this was too much for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Although
they had expressed no qualms about Knights’ adoption of direct balancing as
the mode of analysis, and they did not contest it in Samson, they did attack
the outcome of the direct balancing test. They challenged this result by
emphasizing that the Samson Court was the first to approve of suspicionless
searching on the whim of a solitary police officer. The police officer in
Knights had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause. The officer in
Samson had nothing. In effect, the dissent maintained that neither specialneeds nor totality balancing should permit such searches.
Knights and Samson sit poised to devour any Fourth Amendment cases
founded on normal categorizing. “Unlike the special needs doctrine,
Knights provides no threshold test to decide when balancing can

124

125

126
127
128

for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority
to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted” (footnote
omitted)).
E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we
must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of reasonableness.’”).
In Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 613 14 (2007) (per curiam), the Court
referred to Summers, 452 U.S. at 692, as “weighing whether the search in [that case] was
reasonable” in view of the balance between the “incremental intrusion on personal
liberty” and the government’s interests in safely and efficaciously searching pursuant to a
warrant. But the real balancing in Summers occurred at the level of deciding that it can be
constitutionally reasonable to “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper
search [for contraband] is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. Even though this right
to detain the occupants during a search may be implicit in the warrant, as Summers held,
whether a particular detention is unreasonably long or abusive turns on the
circumstances of the case.
547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Id. at 852 n.3.
Id. at 855 (“California’s supervisory system is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable,
taking into account a parolee’s substantially diminished expectation of privacy.”).
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appropriately replace the warrant and probable cause requirements.”
Nonetheless, it is possible that few such cases will be drawn into their sphere.
Despite the aggressive pronouncements in Knights and Samson (and now
Mitchell and other DNA-BC cases) that a direct resort to balancing is the
general rule, it remains an anomaly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Except for the two P’s—probationers and parolees—the Court proceeds
with business as usual, which is to say categorical analysis of the need for a
130
131
warrant.
Thus, in Arizona v. Gant, Justice Stevens wrote for the Court,
without a backwards glance to Knights and Samson, that
[c]onsistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every
case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic
rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
132
well-delineated exceptions.
133
A year later, in City of Ontario v. Quon, every Justice subscribed to this
134
proposition. The next Term, in Kentucky v. King, every Justice embraced
the basic rule. It would be best to acknowledge explicitly that the analytical
framework of Knights and Samson is inconsistent with precedent and to
129
130

131
132
133
134

Antoine McNamara, Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 209, 240 (2007).
Various commentators seem to regard the per se rule as moribund. E.g., Orin S. Kerr,
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 318 (2012)
(“Reasonableness now is understood as requiring a balancing of interests . . . .”); Cynthia
Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: the Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81
MISS. L.J. 1133, 1135 (2012) (“Instead of interpreting the Fourth Amendment as
expressing a preference for warrants, the modern Court reads the text of the Fourth
Amendment as simply requiring reasonableness.”); William W. Greenlaugh & Mark J.
Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (1994) (“[T]he Court has all but rejected
the ‘per se’ rule and strengthened its embrace of the ‘reasonableness’ approach.”).
Professor Lee adds, however, that “[i]ronically, even though today’s Court does not
accord the warrant preference view the premier status it once held, the Court still applies
it in the bulk of its cases.” Id. at 1146. This pattern is less ironic when one recognizes
that the Court understandably employs a balancing approach in (1) establishing
categorical exceptions to the warrant or probable cause requirements, (2) applying the
special-needs exception to cases involving special interests, and (3) determining whether
the method of effecting a search or seizure is unreasonable. Outside of these situations
(and the two probationer-parolee cases), the Court continues to use the categorical
framework to ascertain the reasonableness of searches undertaken to acquire evidence in
criminal cases.
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Id. at 338 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) and applying the
incident-to-arrest exception instead of direct balancing).
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (quoting Katz and applying the special-needs exception).
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853–54 (2011) (analyzing the reasonableness of a search of a home
from the standpoint of a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement (for exigent
circumstances) rather than via a direct inquiry into what might seem reasonable).
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This more forthright
defend the outcomes, if at all, on different grounds.
approach would confine direct balancing to the two P’s (or better, eliminate
it entirely).
The availability of totality balancing prompted an exchange among the
136
Ninth Circuit judges on the panel in United States v. Pool.
The two judges
who were willing to uphold DNA-BC (at least after an indictment) offered
no opinion on “whether the DNA collection provision could meet the
special needs test because our precedent directs us to apply the totality of
137
the circumstances test.”
With that standard in place, they deemed the
138
federal detainee law constitutional.
Despite the circuit’s previous use of
the sweeping and inaccurate language of Samson and Knights about the
139
universality of direct balancing, the dissenting judge sought to confine
totality balancing to the two P’s. She emphasized that “[t]he Supreme Court
has upheld searches as a condition of release under [the totality] test only
after an individual has been convicted of a crime and hence has a lowered
140
privacy interest.”

135

136
137
138
139

140

One could maintain (none too convincingly) that the departure from the normal
framework was suitable because “those people” consented to the conditions of their
supervised release or because they are out of prison as an act of grace that does not
include the normal freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 863 64 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra 7, at 11 (Sotomayor, J.). For critical discussion of these theories, see
McNamara, supra note 129.
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1220 23.
United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Taking our cue from Samson,
we reaffirm that ‘the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ and adopt
the ‘general Fourth Amendment approach,’ which ‘examin[es] the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable.’” (citations omitted)).
Pool, 621 F.3d at 1235 (Schroeder, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1237 (finding that no
“exception under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach applies because Pool, as a
pretrial defendant, does not have the reduced privacy interests of the convicted felons in
Kincade or Kriesel”). As McNamara, supra note 129, observed, other Ninth Circuit judges
have interpreted Knights as creating an implicit threshold requirement: Balancing
is allowed only because of the probationer’s ‘diminished expectation of privacy.’
E.g., United States v. , 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (“Knights . . . affirmed the . . . possibility that conditional releasees’
diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial
assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures
of special needs analysis.”).
Id. at 240 n.204. In a subsequent Ninth Circuit case upholding California’s DNA-BC law,
a dissenting opinion of Judge Fletcher not only maintained that totality balancing was
unavailable, but that Supreme Court cases on fingerprinting established that the
California law infringed the Fourth Amendment. This claim rests on an obvious
misreading of the fingerprint cases. See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1065–66 (9th
Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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This observation begs the question of why the Court’s putatively “general
Fourth Amendment approach” should apply just to this specific category of
people. True, the Court spoke of the diminished expectations of privacy in
Knights and Samson as arising from notice to a parolee or probationer that
he would be at risk of warrantless or suspicionless searches. But the Court
referred to a lowered privacy interest only as a part of the totality of
141
circumstances to be considered in judging reasonableness.
The Court did
not present it as the reason to switch to totality balancing. Changing a factor
considered in totality balancing to the threshold requirement for
undertaking that balancing “would not render the approach any more
142
principled.”
Why should the judgment that some groups are notified that
they have fewer protections, or that they are liable to other intrusions (to
further some special governmental interest), subject them to indiscriminate
143
totality balancing?
Furthermore, it leaves opens the argument that direct
balancing is appropriate for arrestees because they too have a “lowered
privacy interest,” as shown by the historic practice of forcing them to provide
144
the state with their fingerprints and photographs. It is not so easy to chain
Knights and Samson to the two P’s.
In sum, neither totality balancing nor special-needs balancing offers the
best mode of analyzing the intelligence-gathering function of biometric
database systems. Direct balancing repudiates the normal method of
analysis—classifying practices via reasonably well-defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement. To be sure, the boundaries of the special-needs
exception are not well marked, but no special interest justifies sheltering the
collection of biometric data for generating evidence in criminal cases with
that exception.
Fortunately, there are better ways to analyze fingerprinting and DNA
sampling on arrest. In the final Parts of this Article, I examine two possible
ways to uphold these practices. Part III discusses what I call the two-step
shuffle and the unexplored territory of multiple needs. It is a branch of
special-needs analysis that deserves renewed attention and revision in the
Supreme Court. Specifically, I suggest that multipurpose search regimes
should be eligible for special-needs balancing. Part IV looks into the

141

142
143

144

See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 49 (2006) (recapitulating Knights’ reasoning);
id. at 852 (relying in the course of its balancing on the conclusion that “parolees . . . have
severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone”).
McNamara, supra note 129, at 240 n.204.
Cf. Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 269 70 (2007) (“[A] diminished privacy interest is a conclusory
finding, and its use to justify an exception to the warrant requirement is thus circular.”).
E.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 704–05 (Va. 2007) (analogizing DNA
testing to the historic practice of fingerprinting).
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balancing itself and presents a new categorical exception for certain types of
biometric data.

III. THE TWO-STEP SHUFFLE AND MULTIPLE-NEEDS ANALYSIS
A. Fingerprint Databases for Authentication and Intelligence
The earliest widespread use of fingerprints in the criminal justice system
145
was authentication—verifying or establishing the identity of a prisoner.
Initially, the fingerprint cards supplemented a set of body measurements
devised by Alphonse Bertillon, a clerk in the Prefecture of Police in Paris,
France, and adopted there in 1882. “Bertillon’s anthropometric method
measured height, reach (middle finger to middle finger of outstretched
arms), trunk, length of head, width of head, length of right ear, width of
right ear, length of left foot, length of left middle finger, length of left little
146
finger, and length of left forearm.”
By 1894, all new arrestees in England
147
and Bengal “were measured and fingerprinted.”
In 1897, after a workable
system for classifying fingerprints was developed, “the government of India
sanctioned the sole use of fingerprints as a means of identification for
148
prisoners,” avoiding the laborious task of measuring body parts.
In 1902, Bertillon went through his fingerprint cards from prisoners
until he found one that contained an inked print that seemed to match the
photograph of a bloody print on a piece of broken glass found at the scene
149
of a murder.
Thus was born the use of fingerprint records as an
intelligence database. In 1924, the FBI established its Identification Division
“to provide a central repository of criminal identification data for law
150
enforcement agencies throughout the United States.”
From an original
810,188 records, the FBI’s criminal file grew to about fifteen million
151
individuals by the early 1960s.
Despite refinements in the classification
system, manual searching was becoming impracticable.
Automated

145

146
147
148
149

150
151

Jeffery G. Barnes, History, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 1-10 (Alan McRoberts &
Debbie McRoberts eds., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
225321.pdf. Prior to this development, fingerprints were used as evidence in a few
criminal cases. Id. at 1-8 (referring to an exoneration in 1880); id. at 1-9 to 1-10
(referring to “the first homicide solved by fingerprint evidence” in 1892).
Id. at 1-12.
Id. at 1-14.
Id.
Id. at 1-15 to 1-16 (quoting Charles R. Kingston & Paul L. Kirk, Historical Development and
Evaluation of the “12 Point Rule” in Fingerprint Identification, 20 INT. CRIM. POLICE REV. 62
(1965)); SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 170 71 (2001).
Moses et al., supra note 13, at 6–4.
Id.
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fingerprint identification systems capable of trawling large databases of
digitalized images for possible matches to latent prints from crime scenes
152
153
These systems scored successes in the 1980s and
emerged in the 1970s.
154
underwent “frenzied expansion” in the 1990s.
Today, the FBI’s criminal
file houses the fingerprints and criminal histories of more than seventy
155
million people.
I rehearse this history to suggest that using fingerprint databases to
discover suspects is not exactly a second-generation technology. The
potential intelligence function of fingerprint databases was known from the
outset of arrestee fingerprinting in America. Despite the possibility that the
fingerprint card collections would generate evidence for unrelated
prosecutions, as Bertillon’s 1902 trawl did, early courts generally brushed
aside due process challenges to photographing and fingerprinting
156
arrestees.
Presumably, today’s courts would uphold arrestee
fingerprinting against a Fourth Amendment challenge either as too minor
an intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests to create a reasonable
157
expectation of privacy and hence to constitute a “search or seizure” or as
158
constituting a reasonable search under the special-needs exception.
Yet, these conclusions are not self-evident. Fingerprints are not as visible
159
to the public as physical appearance, handwriting, or voice, and they
might contain a quantum of information that could be used for purposes
160
other than identification.
Expelling them from the realm of the Fourth
Amendment therefore seems too harsh. And, although the special-needs

152
153
154
155
156
157

158

159

160

Id. at 6-6 to 6-7.
Id. at 6-7 to 6-8.
Id. at 6-8.
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis, (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
See sources cited supra notes 9, 24.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.N.H.
1998) (holding that fingerprinting and hair sampling are not searches); Palmer v. State,
679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997) (holding that taking fingerprints at trial was not an
unreasonable seizure); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994)
(holding that requiring sex offenders to appear for fingerprinting and sex offender
registration is an unreasonable seizure, but that fingerprinting itself is not a search).
See, e.g., United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 222 25 (N.D. Ohio 1968)
(distinguishing the identification uses of fingerprints from evidentiary uses and holding
that the identification use promotes a legitimate governmental interest that renders the
fingerprinting of those formally charged with crimes not a search).
See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy implicated in being forced to provide a handwriting sample); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 15 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy implicated in
being forced to provide a voice sample).
See infra Part IV.
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exception works well for a database system for authentication, how does that
161
justify its application to a database for intelligence purposes?
It is tempting to answer this last question by invoking the doctrine that
once the government has acquired information legitimately, it may use it
162
freely without again triggering the Fourth Amendment.
For instance,
once police, proceeding within the scope of a valid search warrant, learn
that a suspect has a pair of size twelve Bruno Magli shoes in his closet, they
may use this fact to tie the suspect to later crimes in which size twelve Bruno
Magli shoeprints are discovered. Thus, courts have held that repeating a
163
database trawl requires no further Fourth Amendment justification and
that acquiring a DNA profile pursuant to a court order in one case allows it
164
to be reused in an independent investigation without a new court order.
Likewise, it is clear that police may use the information gleaned for a
“special purpose” in a criminal case against the searched individual. For
instance, the police may make an inventory of the possessions of detainees
in accordance with a “standardized procedure” that advances “a range of
165
governmental interests,” and drugs discovered in such a special-needs
166
search are admissible in a trial for illegal possession.
Similarly, it might
161

162

163

164

165

166

Compare Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 94–95 (1995) (arguing that, for fingerprinting, the
governmental interest in identifying criminal suspects outweighs any privacy concerns),
with Simmons, supra note 106, at 849 (advocating a doctrinal change that would forbid
the state from making any criminal evidentiary use of the fruits of special-needs searches).
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2008) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require governments to discard any
information they have already lawfully collected.”)
See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that retrawling even after
a sentence is completed is not a new search). For a defense of this result, see David H.
Kaye, DNA Database Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 41, 49 (2011).
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1268 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that
fresh court authorization is not required before the police may use a sample validly
collected for a different purpose); People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (“[O]nce a person’s blood sample has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer
assert either privacy claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to
the use of that sample.”).
See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (“[I]t is entirely proper for police to
remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an
arrested person who is to be jailed. A range of governmental interests supports an
inventory process.”); see also id. at 647 (“[S]tandardized inventory procedures are
appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests . . . .”).
Id. at 642 43. In Lafayette, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to an “inventory search” as “a
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,” id. at 643, but the case plainly falls
within the rubric of “special needs” announced two years later in New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469
U.S. 325, 333 n.2 (1985), for the Court proceeded to balance “intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against . . . promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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seem that once the state has stored a fingerprint for authentication in the
event of later arrests or has run a fingerprint through an AFIS database to
authenticate identity, it also may check it against latent prints from unsolved
crimes. The argument proceeds in two quick steps. First, the state may
collect the sample without a warrant to meet the special interest in
authentication. Second, having legitimately acquired the sample, the state
may use it for investigation.
Two Supreme Court cases stand in the way of this two-step shuffle. In
167
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court declined to apply the specialneeds exception to a program in which police used dogs to sniff for drugs in
168
vehicles pulled over in groups at fixed roadblocks.
Distinguishing sharply
between “highway safety interests and the general interest in crime
169
control,” the majority reasoned that “[b]ecause the primary purpose of
the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
170
Amendment.”
Likewise, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court
invalidated a program in which a state university hospital tested urine
samples from pregnant women for cocaine and reported positive results to
the police to convince the women to participate in substance-abuse
171
counseling in lieu of criminal prosecution.
Again, the majority of the
172
Court emphasized “the relevant primary purpose” —which was said to be
173
“the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers.”
These cases can block the first step of the shuffle. They purport to
prevent the state from relying on the special-needs exception for a “program
whose primary purpose [is] to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
174
wrongdoing” or whose “immediate objective [is] to generate evidence for
175
law enforcement purposes . . . .”
But whether these words are an
insurmountable obstacle to fingerprint intelligence databases is
questionable.
Neither Ferguson nor Edmond required the Court to
distinguish between a primary and a secondary motive, or to respond to two
167
168
169
170

171
172
173
174
175

531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 44.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41 42. Six Justices subscribed to this view. Justice O’Connor wrote the majority
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which was joined, in part, by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, argues against “a new non-law enforcement primary purpose
test lifted from a distinct area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the searches
of homes and businesses.” Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
532 U.S. 67, 75 76 (2001).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 82 (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 484 (4th. Cir. 2009)
(Blake, J., dissenting in part)).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83.
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motives of equal importance. Despite the Court’s use of the words “primary”
and “secondary,” neither Ferguson nor Edmond was a mixed-motive case.
Both were single-motive cases involving single-purpose programs. As a
result, the “primary purpose” language is dicta.
Because this aspect of the cases has generally gone unnoticed, it may be
helpful to elaborate slightly. In Ferguson, the state hospital adopted a
cocaine testing program that relied on the criminal law not to punish
176
women, but to induce them to comply with drug abuse programs.
Nevertheless, the state hospital established the testing program in
consultation with the police department for the express purpose of
177
obtaining evidence for criminal cases.
Consequently, the Court was able
to say that the sole immediate purpose of the program was to generate
178
evidence against cocaine users for criminal prosecutions.
This, in turn,
permitted the final conclusion: A program that has as its only immediate
goal subjecting individuals to the criminal law involves no special needs.
Discerning the primacy of the general crime-control purpose in Edmond
179
was even easier, for this was the only purpose the city proffered.
How the
Court would have handled a more complicated system therefore remained
unsettled. The majority was clear on this, stating that it was not considering
“whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the primary
purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of
180
interdicting narcotics.”
The city could have accomplished this by initially
establishing roadblocks strictly to check for intoxicated drivers. After
employing this program for a decent interval, it could have added a dog-sniff
in parallel with the sobriety check. The sobriety checkpoint would have
been consistent with ample precedent allowing such stops for special
181
needs.
The interdiction-by-dog step would not have been a search. The
182
183
Court already had held, and all the Justices in Edmond agreed, that dogsniffing for drugs does not rise to the level of a search. The Edmond majority
specifically chose to “express no view on the question whether police may
expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to
184
detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.”

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id. at 83 (“[T]he threat of law enforcement intervention . . . provided the necessary
‘leverage’ to make the [p]olicy effective.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 82 84.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2.
Id.
E.g., Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707); id. at 48, 52 (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting).
Id. at 47 n.2.
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Mixed-motive or primary-purpose analysis is a major headache in many
areas of the law, including torts, criminal law, and employment
185
The analysis of purpose in constitutional adjudication is
discrimination.
186
notoriously slippery. It is not surprising that Edmond and Ferguson offer no
guidance on how to handle a case in which the legislature or agency
adopting a program of warrantless searches has simultaneously mixed
motives—both normal law enforcement and other interests. Although the
Court’s discomfort with pretextual special-needs searching is
187
understandable, it is a little odd to consider motive at all in special-needs
cases. How is it that the balance of interests permits dispensing with
warrants or individualized suspicion when non-law enforcement interests
alone are pursued, but not when both law enforcement and non-law
enforcement interests reinforce each other?
Arrestee fingerprinting seems to present the situation that Edmond and
Ferguson do not quite reach. Historically, authentication was the dominant
reason for collecting prints; searching for matches to latent prints was
188
secondary.
Given the confluence of good reasons to acquire prints, even
today—when the authentication and intelligence functions of fingerprint
databases are equally clear—the special-needs exception should apply.
Courts should be able to balance the full set of government interests against
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests to gauge reasonableness. The

185

186

187

188

See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279 (2007) (distinguishing among several
approaches to the problem of mixed motives in various areas and arguing against “mixedmotive analysis” as a defense to racially motivated peremptory challenges to jurors); David
Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115,
134 (2012) (complaining that the primary-purpose test for determining whether a
statement is “testimonial” and hence subject to the Confrontation Clause is
indeterminate); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, The Common Law, and Proximate
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (arguing that tort concepts of proximate cause should not be
used in mixed-motive statutory discrimination cases).
The domains in which the Court considers whether legislation is motivated by an
impermissible purpose are catalogued in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 70–73 (1997). On the history of judicial methods for
inferring motive, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1784 (2008).
When a search or seizure is not conducted pursuant to a program that dispenses with
individualized suspicion, or when such suspicion is present, the Court abjures all inquiry
into motive and pretext. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011).
Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical Lessons for
the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE
63, 73 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
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result, as indicated in the discussion of such interests in Part IV, would be for
189
courts to sustain current fingerprinting practices.

B. DNA Databases for Authentication and Intelligence
The legislative history of existing arrestee DNA databases resembles the
monochromatic evidence of motive in Edmond and Ferguson. Realistically,
the overwhelming legislative purpose of arrestee sampling, given that
fingerprinting already is in place, has been intelligence. Therefore, it seems
difficult to use the two-step shuffle to justify DNA sampling on arrest.
Nonetheless, states can rebrand arrestee DNA profiling as a component
of a multi-modal authentication system using fingerprints, photographs, iris
190
scans, and who knows what else.
The cost and ease of DNA testing will
191
continue to drop.
Although fingerprints are superior to DNA for
authentication when it is important to distinguish between monozygotic
192
(identical) twins, computerized DNA profiles are easier to search for
matching records without expert human assistance than are AFIS databases.
Officials might want to store both fingerprint and DNA data for
authentication, just as they once stored both anthropometric and
fingerprint data. Indeed, in Maryland v. King, all fifty states argued in an
amicus brief that “like photograph and palm print databases, forensic
identification DNA databases are not superfluous to fingerprints even for
record keeping purposes. DNA profiles can and do resolve conflicts in
fingerprint and criminal history data, allowing states to recognize incorrect
193
entries.”
Although this rationale seems like an afterthought, a state that
has not adopted an arrestee DNA requirement could create a legislative
189

190

191

192

193

See Krent, supra note 161 (arguing that it would be reasonable to create a fingerprint
database for use in future investigations since the law enforcement interests outweigh the
suspects’ privacy interests).
Brief of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207) [hereinafter States’ Amicus Brief]; Next Generation
Identification, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Feb.
11, 2013).
Only twelve years ago, DNA identification seemed so slow, expensive, and limited in the
range of cases to which it would apply, that it could not match the power and ease of
fingerprinting. See COLIN BEAVAN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND
THE MURDER CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE 202 (2001) (arguing that
fingerprinting is more useful than DNA analysis).
Differences between monozygotic twins probably can be detected in DNA samples, but
the genetic or epigenetic features that might be useful change during the individuals’
lifetimes. See C.T. Li et al., Epigenetics and Its New Progress in Monozygotic Twins, 25 FA YI
XUE ZA ZHI 212 (2009); Daniel Schlieper et al., Discrimination of Monozygotic Twins (and
Clones) on the DNA Level, 1239 INT’L CONGRESS SERIES 857, 858 (2003) (suggesting a
method to use DNA analysis to distinguish between monozygotic twins based on B
lymphocytes).
States’ Amicus Brief, supra note 190, at 19.
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history indicative of multiple purposes, and states with laws in place could
amend them to provide explicitly for both authentication and intelligence
uses of the identification profiles.
To be sure, a court aggressively enforcing a primary-purpose test for
special-needs balancing might dismiss this legislative strategy as ineffectual.
Rather than pursue the questionable and elusive primary-purpose test,
however, I shall move to the final issue in assessing the constitutionality of
including arrestee data in biometric databases. In the end, the issue is
balancing. The route to this balancing could be the direct (and doubtful)
step of totality balancing that the Court took in Knights and Samson for
offenders on supervised release. It could be the special-needs exception for
the pursuit of “normal” law enforcement interests (also doubtful for a
database with a pure intelligence function but defensible for a database with
a mixed function). Or, as discussed below, it could be the exceptioncreating balancing long associated with the warrant requirement.

IV. BALANCING AND THE BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION
The courts that have balanced the interests of the state and the arrested
individual, whether under the totality-of-the-circumstances or the specialneeds rubric, have generally agreed on the constitutionality of DNA
194
collection before conviction.
The range of interests considered in this
mélange of cases varies, as does the willingness of each judge to give much
weight to various factors. To avoid repetition and inordinate detail on each
balancing test, I shall present and assess the more significant interests in the
context of the pre-exception balancing that have led the Supreme Court to
recognize certain exceptions to the general rule that a search requires a
warrant and probable cause. The balancing analysis would be quite similar
under the label of “special needs” or “totality of the circumstances.” I begin
with the government’s interest in gathering biometric data, then proceed to

194

Six of these ten courts have found that the scales tip in favor of DNA–BC. See Kaye,
Scorecard, supra note 5. However, dissenting judges in some of these cases sharply
criticized the majorities’ evaluation of the balance of interests. See, e.g., Haskell v. Harris,
669 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“[I]f DNA is taken from
arrestees . . . for the purposes of identification, that taking is permissible. However, if it is
taken solely for the purposes of investigation, that taking is a seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Rendell, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he majority gives short shrift to an arrestee’s and pretrial detainee’s
expectation of privacy in his DNA, reducing it to an interest in identity only, and
overstates the significance of the Government’s interest in collecting evidence to solve
crimes.”); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, J.
dissenting) (dismissing the government’s professed interests as “meaningless” or
inapposite prior to a conviction), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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the individual’s interests in not revealing the data. The analysis supports a
unified and circumscribed biometric exception that permits the government
to acquire fingerprints and DNA before any conviction.

A. The Authentication Interest: True Identity
As discussed in Part I, the state has substantial interests in knowing who
is who. These include deciding whether an individual is a flight risk,
providing prosecutors with criminal history information before trial,
deciding the conditions under which a detainee should be housed, notifying
next of kin in the event of the death or serious illness of an arrestee,
supplying judges or jurors with relevant information during the guilt or
sentencing phases of a criminal trial, and giving employers and others data
195
on whom they might hire for sensitive positions.
Authentication, as we
saw, was the principal, original motivation for taking bodily measurements,
196
and soon thereafter, fingerprints of arrestees.
At first blush, it might seem as if the same cannot be said of DNA
samples. Dismissing the government’s analogy of DNA sampling to
fingerprint collection as “pure folly,” the United States v. Mitchell district court
wrote
[F]ingerprints already provide an unequivocal, and in some respects, a
better record of personal identity than forensic DNA typing.
Monozygotic twins, for example, can be distinguished by their
fingerprints, but not by their DNA. . . . The only reasonable use of DNA
is investigative, it is not an identification science[,] it is an information
science. The identification issue in this instance is a red herring, as there
is no compelling reason to require a DNA sample in order to “identify”
197
an arrestee.
The Maryland Court of Appeals took the same position in King v. State, when
it insisted that “identification is not what King’s DNA sample was used for or
needed [for] . . . . Solving cold cases . . . was the only State interest served by
198
the collection of his DNA.”
This is a fair point with respect to the status quo, but an interest need
not be “compelling” to be cognizable. Several circuits have noted that a
determined criminal can alter his appearance and fingerprints to disguise
199
his identity.
The Constitution does not lock the state into a single system
195
196
197
198
199

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part III.
681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608–09 (footnote omitted).
42 A.3d 549, 578 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012).
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 414; Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992). The King
court responded by leaving the door to DNA sampling open for “conceivable, albeit
somewhat unlikely, scenarios where an arrestee may have altered his or her fingerprints
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for authentication. Given the inherent limitations of identifiers like driver’s
licenses, a more secure system for establishing personal identity would
involve multiple modes of on-the-spot biometric authentication. Police
already are experimenting with portable fingerprint scanners to “cut
through nonsense on the street when suspects try to stall cops by using a
seemingly endless string of aliases” and “to identify the dead at homicide
200
and accident scenes.”
But “lights-out” AFIS searches do not yet work for
201
latent prints. In the not-so-distant future, portable devices for STR analysis
202
should be operational.
At that point, Mitchell’s red herring could be
203
replaced by a different kettle of fish.
Including DNA profiling in a
combination of biometrics for authentication might or might not be a good
204
use of resources, but this is not something a court should decide. The
marginal benefit of DNA profiling is not compelling, but neither is it zero.
DNA profiling and fingerprinting are not mutually exclusive.

B. The Intelligence Interest During and After the Pretrial Period
Courts are quick to describe the government’s interests in using DNA
databases to associate individuals with crime scene samples as “undeniably
205
compelling” if not “monumental.”
Killers who left piles of bodies behind

200

201
202

203

204

205

or facial features (making difficult or doubtful identification through comparison to
earlier fingerprints or photographs on record).” King, 42 A.3d at 580.
Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Gets High-Tech Upgrade with New Portable Fingerprint Scanner,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-high-techupgrade-new-portable-fingerprint-scanner-article-1.441512.
A “lights-out” search is one that involves no human interpretation. Moses, supra note 14,
at 6-10 n.4, 6-20.
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National District Attorneys Association in Support of
Petitioner at 20, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) (“Three companies
have produced and are beginning to market Rapid DNA machines . . . .”); Andrew J.
Hopwood et al., Integrated Microfluidic System for Rapid Forensic DNA Analysis: Sample
Collection to DNA Profile, 82 ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 6991 (2010) (describing an instrument
that could conduct STR DNA analysis in a police station); Cedric Hurth et al., An
Automated Instrument for Human STR Identification: Design, Characterization, and Experimental
Validation, 31 ELECTROPHORESIS 3510 (2010) (describing a small instrument for
performing DNA analysis cheaply and quickly).
Much of the questioning at the oral argument in King was devoted to this possibility. See
David H. Kaye, The Oral Argument in Maryland v. King—Part II, FORENSIC SCI.,
STATISTICS, AND THE LAW (Mar. 3, 2013), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/
2013/03/the-oral-argument-in-maryland-v-king_3.html.
See Brief of Amici Curiae 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence in Support of Respondent,
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) (arguing in part that DNA-BC is
ineffective and undesirable).
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2007)), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc). During the oral argument in King, Justice Alito declared that “this is perhaps
the most important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in decades. . . .
[T]his is what is at stake: Lots of murders, lots of rapes that can be—that can be solved

Apr. 2013]

ARRESTEE DNA

1131

them and eluded investigators for decades have been apprehended as a
206
DNA evidence now produces revelations in
result of database trawls.
207
crimes for which it was once thought to be useless.
In one case, a dead
208
mosquito in a stolen car led police to the suspected thief.
In the
209
fingerprinting arena, “cold hits” began as early at 1902.
Today, they are
210
ubiquitous, and the FBI gives a Latent Hit of the Year award to one lucky
211
examiner and posts a video about it on its website.
Merely praising the power of high-tech fingerprint and DNA databases to
help police crack tough cases, however, does not define the precise value of
arrestee sampling. The more focused question is the government’s interests
in collecting a DNA sample soon after an arrest “rather than after a person’s
212
conviction” or possibly not at all (for systems that retain the arrest records
with or without conviction). With regard to promptly linking an arrestee to
an unsolved case, the Pool panel reasoned that “the government’s interests
remain substantial” because
There is usually a lengthy period of time between an initial
determination of probable cause and a person’s trial (and even more
time before a conviction becomes final after an unsuccessful appeal).
During this period of time, the government has an interest in
determining whether the individual may be released pending trial
without endangering society and ensuring that he or she complies with
the conditions of his or her release. The collection of a DNA sample
allows the government to ensure that the defendant did not commit

206

207

208

209
210
211
212

using this new technology that involves a very minimal intrusion on personal privacy.”
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 35.
E.g., ANN RULE, GREEN RIVER, RUNNING RED: THE REAL STORY OF THE GREEN RIVER
KILLER—AMERICA’S DEADLIEST SERIAL MURDERER 343, 360 (2004); Andrew Blankstein &
Joel Rubin, Grim Sleeper Suspect’s Photos of Women Released, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010,
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/17/local/la-me-grim-sleeper20101217; Ruben Vives, San Francisco Police Link ‘Night Stalker’ Richard Ramirez to Girl’s 1984
Slaying, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/oct/23/local/me-richard-ramirez23. See supra Part I.C.
E.g., Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, A Smudge Could Trap a Thief, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2004, at A1; Charlie Jannetto, DNA Solves Wider Range of Crimes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
July 27, 2008, at B1.
Mosquito Helps Police in Stolen Car Investigation, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/3902862/Mosquitohelps-police-in-stolen-car-investigation.html.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.B.
Latent Hit of the Year Award Videos, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/iafis/iafis_latent_hit_of_the_year (last visited July 15, 2011).
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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some other crime and discourages a defendant from violating any
213
condition of his or her pretrial release.

Still more can be said. During the sometimes lengthy time required for case
completion, “witnesses can become unavailable or their memories can fade,
evidence can be lost, and the statute of limitations can run. Law
214
enforcement could be . . . investigating innocent persons . . . .”
Victims of
crimes that could have been solved earlier may have to wait additional years
215
216
for closure. Exonerations could be delayed.
Furthermore, even arrestees who are not successfully charged, or
defendants who ultimately are acquitted, can be dangerous. Even if they
eventually end up in a convicted-offender database, how many people might
they kill, rape, or rob in the interim? Although it would be unfair to tarnish
217
all arrestees with this broad a brush, there are disturbing anecdotes. The
man indicted in Los Angeles’s “Grim Sleeper” crimes could have been
apprehended years earlier—and an untold number of rapes and murders
218
prevented—had his arrests prompted DNA profiling.
Advocates of
arrestee DNA sampling have produced scores of other examples of
219
preventable major crimes.
Although systematic research would be far
213

214
215
216

217
218

219

Id. The Third Circuit refuses to count the detection and deterrence of violations of
pretrial release as a legitimate government interest on the curious ground that “[a]ny
such interest is outweighed by the presumption of innocence.” United States v. Mitchell,
652 F.3d 387, 415 n.25 (3d Cir. 2011). Normally, the presumption of innocence in
Anglo-American law is simply “a rule applicable at trial that the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt.” ANDREW C.
STUMER, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
EVIDENTIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVES xxxviii (2010). Thus, the Supreme Court wrote in Bell v. Wolfish, that the
presumption of innocence “has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has ever begun.” 441 U.S. 520, 533
(1979). The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a more expansive view, but
the addition of a “second, broader facet,” has been criticized as a “vaporous euphemism
for fairness.” STUMER, supra, at xxxix (quoting Patrick Healy, Proof and Policy: No Golden
Threads, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 355, 365).
Appellee’s Brief at 41, Haskell v. Brown, No. 10-10-15152 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2010).
Id.
See Lawrence Mower & Doug McMurdo, Las Vegas Police Reveal DNA Error Put Wrong Man
in Prison, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 8, 2011, available at http://www.lvrj.com/
news/dna-related-error-led-to-wrongful-conviction-in-2001-case-125160484.html
(DNA
database hit producing an exoneration that would not have occurred otherwise).
See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (invoking “the
moral polestar of our criminal justice system—the presumption of innocence”).
Gillian Flaccus, ‘Grim Sleeper’ Suspect Had 4-Decade Arrest Record, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/10/grim-sleeper-suspecthad-4-decade-arrest-record.
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S13756, (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“We
know from real life examples that an all-arrestee database can prevent many future
offenses. In March of this year, the City of Chicago produced a case study of eight serial
killers in that city who would have been caught after their first offense—rather than after
their fourth or tenth—if an all-arrestee database had been in place.”); States’ Amicus
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220

it is hard to deny that arrestee
better than the advocacy reports,
fingerprinting and DNA profiling and databasing (especially if the record
remains in the database after an acquittal or dismissal) advances—to some
degree—a compelling government interest.

C. A Lesser Intrusion
Courts usually say two things about the interests of convicted offenders
or arrestees in avoiding fingerprinting or DNA profiling—that these
221
interests are of minor weight, and that an arrest or conviction diminishes
222
them even further.
Below, I argue that the former statement is correct
and that it should prompt the adoption of a categorical exception to the
warrant requirement for biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA
profiles. As a description of the weight of the affected individuals’ interest,
however, the latter statement betrays a basic confusion. Prisoners do not
lose the right to keep officials out of their living quarters because they enter
prison with a diminished interest in privacy. Rather, they have a diminished
223
expectation because the state has excellent reasons to inspect their cells.
Arrestees do not lose any right to keep their fingerprint patterns to
themselves because they have a reduced interest in secrecy. Rather, they have
a reduced expectation because the state has strong reasons to acquire their
prints. The language of diminished or reduced expectations is not the
224
premise of an argument. It is the conclusion.
The phrase does not mean
that anyone starts out with a weaker interest. It means that the arrested or
convicted individual’s interests do not prevail. To ascertain whether this
conclusion is correct, we need to give due weight to the interests that
everyone has in being free from unwanted intrusions. I therefore examine
these interests and then show how they support an exception for biometric
data.

220
221

222
223
224

Brief, supra note 190; Ashby Jones, Arrested and Swabbed: DNA Tests Challenged, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 2011, at A3 (listing similar reports). But see supra note 19 (describing a limitation
in these studies).
See supra Part I.B.
E.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The government’s
interest in building a DNA database for identification purposes . . . outweighs the
minimal intrusion into a criminal offender’s diminished expectation of privacy.”).
E.g., id. at 177; People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 92 (Ill. 2006).
See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 1992) (Murnaghan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[B]ecause
DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act function as ‘genetic fingerprints’ used
only for identification purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy
interests in the information derived from a DNA sample.”).
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1. Freedom of Movement and Physical Intrusion
Bodies are special. They are the mind’s interface with and gateway to
the physical universe. Fourth Amendment law respects individual claims to
225
control entry into the body and to direct its movements.
Detention of the
226
body is a seizure of the person, and entry into it a search.
However, the
interest in freedom of movement is largely beside the point when the
227
individual already is legitimately in custody.
A statute might authorize the
228
use of force to hold a person still if the individual resists physically, but the
principal seizure of the person lies in the detention of the arrested or
229
convicted individual.
This detention is neither more nor less of an
infringement of liberty of motion because the state seeks to obtain a
fingerprint or a DNA sample during the period when it has legal custody of
230
the individual.
As for the intrusiveness of collecting the information,
fingerprinting requires no entry into the body, and courts are virtually
unanimous in regarding “the collection of biological samples [for routine
DNA profiling as] only a minimal intrusion on one’s personal physical
231
integrity.”
In short, with respect to bodily integrity, the analogy between
225
226
227

228

229

230

231

For a detailed discussion of the Court’s cases on what constitutes entry into the body, see
Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 476–81.
See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) (observing that a search of a
person and seizure of evidence has long been allowed after a lawful arrest). When the
individual is not in custody, this factor has more bearing on the classification. See Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989) (indicating that any limitation of a
person’s freedom of movement necessary to conducting a search must be considered in
assessing the intrusiveness of the search).
See David H. Kaye, Forceful DNA Collection from Recalcitrant Prisoners, DOUBLE HELIX LAW
(Apr. 17, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/blogs/DoubleHelixLaw/
2011/04/forceful-dna-collection-from-recalcitrant-prisoners.html.
Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (ordering a driver who has already
been stopped to exit the car is a “de minimis” interference with freedom of movement).
Even if resort to reasonable force is a separate Fourth Amendment seizure, it is a
permissible means of executing a search. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 128–29
(Ind. 2000) (forcibly anesthetizing a suspect who would not comply with an order for
taking dental impressions was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); People v. Buza,
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011)
(noting the issuance of an order permitting police to use “reasonable force . . . to bring
defendant . . . into compliance”).
Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that the use of a drug-sniffing
dog on a car that was legitimately stopped for a traffic offense does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment “search”).
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d
1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (“That the gathering of DNA information requires the
drawing of blood rather than inking and rolling a person’s fingertips does not elevate the
intrusion upon the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment interests to a level beyond minimal.
The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a
minimally intrusive search.” (footnote omitted)); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 280
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fingerprinting and DNA sampling is strong. Neither procedure seriously
impacts this pair of interests.

2. Secrecy and Privacy for Purely Identifying Information
There are many things we would like to keep secret. With the possible
exception of any living saints, many disclosures of information about
individuals can be harmful to them. Certainly, most criminals would rather
not be caught. They would not want a fingerprint or DNA sample to lead
police to suspect their involvement in a crime. By itself, the discovery that
an individual is (or merely might be) responsible for or involved in a crime
does not infringe a legitimate interest, let alone an interest that the Fourth
232
Amendment respects.
A bare desire to keep fingerprints or DNA base
pairs secret deserves no weight in the constitutional calculus. There is
something more to be said for a desire to hide one’s true identity and start
anew, but not enough to produce a significant interest in keeping purely
233
identifying data used only for authentication out of government records.
A different use of purely identifying data deserves greater attention. An
arrestee could complain that forging the link to the crime scene invades the
distinct interest in keeping one’s whereabouts secret. A concern with spatial
privacy seems to sit more comfortably within the Fourth Amendment than
234
the desire for freedom from prosecution. In United States v. Karo, for
example, the Supreme Court held that planting a beeper in a container of
ether and tracking the container’s movements through houses and other
235
locations constituted a search.
A database trawl of an arrestee’s
fingerprint or DNA profile might produce a match to a print or DNA sample
found in the bedroom of a murdered woman, which in turn, might lead to
the discovery that the arrestee was having an affair with her.
Nonetheless, database trawling differs from the investigatory technique
in Karo, and the Supreme Court never has viewed the Fourth Amendment as
protecting mere information about a person’s locations. “Staking out” a
suspect’s residence and “tailing” him gives the police a record of the

232

233
234
235

(N.J. 2007) (“We harbor no doubt that the taking of a buccal cheek swab is a very minor
physical intrusion upon the person.”). The situation for DNA and fingerprints is
therefore quite different from that for drug testing of urine, for which “the process of
collecting the sample . . . may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act
of urination, [which] itself implicates privacy interests.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Obviously, however, a
‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective
expectation of not being discovered.”).
See supra Part I.A (rejecting as implausible the claim to a discontinuous identity).
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Id. at 719.
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individual’s movements, but that does not make these time-honored
practices “searches” that trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Only
236
when the government has committed a trespass to a chattel or entered—
physically or technologically—spaces cloaked in a reasonable expectation of
privacy has the Court treated the gathering of intelligence about the
237
locations of people or objects as a search.
Just because police
investigations establish that individuals visited certain places at certain times
does not mean that they implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is
one thing to place a television monitor in a bedroom, as in Orwell’s 1984, or
to track the movements of a private car every minute of every day, as in
238
United States v. Jones.
It is another to discover trace evidence that might
have come from an intruder at one moment in time in a bedroom or a car.
Significantly, the Court never has recognized the impact of trace
evidence on momentary spatial privacy as sufficient to constitute a search, let
239
240
alone as the basis for a weighty interest.
In United States v. Edwards, the
Court, in dealing with paint chips removed from the clothing of an arrestee,
observed that there was no “doubt that clothing or other belongings may be
seized upon arrival of the accused at the place of detention and later
subjected to laboratory analysis or that the test results are admissible at

236

237

238
239

240

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass
upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”).
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding
that taking a dog, trained to alert to drugs, onto the porch of a house to see if drugs are
inside is a search); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001) (holding that
thermal-imaging of a home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within
the home constitutes a search because it can reveal legal and illegal activities within the
house that would not otherwise have been discovered without entering the premises);
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (holding that monitoring a beeper as it moves through a private
residence constitutes a search).
132 S. Ct. at 948 (noting that the car was tracked for twenty-eight days).
Four Justices in Jones regarded “long-term monitoring of . . . a person’s movements on
public streets” as infringing a reasonable expectation of spatial privacy. Id. at 958 (Alito,
J., concurring). The plurality emphasized that “relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our
society has recognized as reasonable.” Id. at 964. Justice Sotomayor agreed that it was
proper to “ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded
and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on” in deciding whether “a
reasonable societal expectation of privacy” exists for long-term GPS monitoring of a
vehicle. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For further discussion of this privacy-inthe-aggregate theory, see Kerr, supra note 130.
415 U.S. 800 (1974).
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241

That the laboratory analyses could implicate spatial privacy was of
trial.”
242
no constitutional moment.
Thus, the various claims for keeping secret purely identifying
information that could link an individual to a crime scene are weak. The
243
Court recognized as much in Davis v. Mississippi,
its leading case on
fingerprinting. A woman in Meridian, Mississippi, reported that “a Negro
youth” broke into her home and raped her. Police, “without warrants, took
at least 24 Negro youths,” including Davis, “to police headquarters where
244
they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and released without charge.”
After Davis’s fingerprints were discovered to match those lifted from the
245
windowsill, he was indicted, tried, and convicted.
His objection to the
admission of the fingerprint evidence was overruled, and the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the theory that fingerprint
evidence is so reliable that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does
246
not apply to this evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court
held that the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence that is
the fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure, regardless of how reliable
247
that evidence may be.
The Court did not state or imply that the acquisition of the prints and
their subsequent analysis made the procedure unconstitutional. Reasoning
that Davis was detained without a warrant and without probable cause, and
that he was not merely fingerprinted but interrogated, the Court concluded
248
that the resulting fingerprints were inadmissible.
The Court’s view of
fingerprinting itself was positive. After establishing that “[d]etentions for
the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are . . . subject to the constraints
249
of the Fourth Amendment,” Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of
the Court, added that

241
242

243
244
245
246
247

248
249

Id. at 803 04.
One might argue that databases will increase the number of cases in which trace evidence
implicates spatial privacy to the point where the Court should rethink its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing
how long-term technological monitoring is more problematic under the Fourth
Amendment than is short-term monitoring). But larger databases are also more
productive ones, thus fortifying the government’s claim that the databases advance vital
interests.
394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 723 24.
Id. at 724; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813 14 (1985) (applying Davis to
fingerprints acquired by bringing a suspect to the police station without a warrant or
probable cause).
Davis, 394 U.S. at 726 28.
Id. at 721.
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Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion
upon personal security than other types of police searches and
detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass
any individual, since the police need only one set of each person’s prints.
Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective
crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions . . . .
Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the
limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient
250
time.

In this way, the Court opened the door to the possibility that “the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly
circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal
investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable
251
cause to arrest.”
Of course, the Davis dictum, now implemented in
procedures for ordering suspects to submit to DNA sampling for
252
identification, still requires at least some individualized suspicion and
judicial review—but only because of the compelled appearance of the
suspect. When the appearance occurs pursuant to grand jury subpoena,
253
neither the compulsion to be present nor the cooperation necessary to
254
255
acquire a voice exemplar or a handwriting sample is considered a search
or seizure. When the appearance is the result of a valid arrest, based on
probable cause—as it is for arrestee fingerprinting and DNA sampling—the
256
only Fourth Amendment barrier recognized in Davis dissolves.
250
251
252

253
254

255

256

Id.
Id. at 728.
See, e.g., In re Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d 1239, 1240
(Vt. 2000) (upholding as constitutional “a nontestimonial identification order that
required [a suspect] to submit to the collection of cheek epithelial cells” on a showing of
reasonable suspicion); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 50, at 421 22 (describing statutes
and court rules requiring suspects to supply physical evidence on a showing of reasonable
suspicion that are “broad enough to apply to DNA samples”).
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (“[A] subpoena to appear before a grand
jury is not a ‘seizure’ in the Fourth Amendment sense . . . .”).
See id. at 15 (“[N]either the summons to appear before the grand jury nor its directive to
make a voice recording infringed upon any interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973) (“The specific and narrowly drawn
directive requiring the witness to furnish a specimen of his handwriting violated no
legitimate Fourth Amendment interest.” (footnote omitted)).
The Court made this crystal clear in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 95 (1973) (noting
that the respondent’s detention was constitutional because the police had probable
cause, and thus “[t]he vice of the detention in Davis is therefore absent”), and Dionisio,
410 U.S. at 11 (“[I]n Davis it was the initial seizure—the lawless dragnet detention—that
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the taking of the
fingerprints . . . . Davis is plainly inapposite to a case where the initial restraint does not
itself infringe the Fourth Amendment.”). In Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
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The Court’s cases on biometric data thus reveal a perception that the
noninvasive acquisition and analysis of purely biometric information carries
257
The intrusion on
with it a greatly diminished expectation of privacy.
Fourth Amendment interests is significantly less than in the usual types of
searches and seizures.

D. The Biometric Exception Defined
Combining the lesser intrusion associated with biometric searches with
the government’s substantial authentication and intelligence interests in
having the biometric data makes the case for the biometric exception
complete. It should be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to
acquire, analyze, store, and trawl biometric data without a warrant and
without individualized suspicion when five conditions hold: (1) the person
legitimately is detained (or the data are acquired without confining the
individual); (2) the process of collecting the data is not physically or
mentally invasive; (3) collection proceeds according to rules that prevent
arbitrary selection of individuals; (4) the biometric data are used only to
establish or authenticate the true identity of a given individual or to link
individuals to crime scenes; and (5) the authentication or intelligencegathering system is valid, reliable, and effective.
Condition (1) ensures that the interest in freedom of movement is not
compromised.
Condition (2) precludes intimate bodily invasions.
Condition (3) removes one of the reasons for interposing a judicial
258
magistrate between the police and the target of a search or seizure.

257
258

2012), however, Judge Fletcher read Davis and a related case, Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811 (1985), for the proposition that “fingerprints may not be taken from an arrestee
solely for an investigative purpose, absent a warrant or reasonable suspicion that the
fingerprints would help solve the crime for which he was taken into custody.” Id. at 1066
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc granted and opinions vacated, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.
2012). This characterization overlooks both the facts and the reasoning of the Court’s
opinions. See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29, at 17.
See Kaye, Drawing Lines, supra note 29 at 15 17; see also Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at
473 76.
If non-intimate biometric measurements are taken on all individuals who are detained for
a given offense, and if individualized evidence is not needed to justify acquiring the
biometric information, then, a judicial magistrate is not required to review the police
officer’s judgment on a case-by-case basis. In special-needs cases with these features, the
Court has dispensed with the warrant process. See Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7 at 483 507.
Outside of the special-needs area, the Supreme Court has been insensitive to bad faith or
pretextual searches and seizures that are objectively justifiable. See Kentucky v. King, 131
S. Ct. 1849, 1856 59 (2011) (using an objective standard even when examining policecreated exigent circumstances); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (holding
that “special-needs and administrative-inspection cases are unusual in their concern for
pretext,” and that in all other cases, “the law demands that we look to whether the arrest
is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer”); Atwater v. City
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Conditions (4) and (5) indicate that the government’s interest in acting is
substantial. When these circumstances are satisfied, harms to individuals
(outside of the prospect of criminal prosecution based on adequate
evidence) and the benefits of judicial review are minor or atypical; hence,
the balance between individual privacy and government interests routinely
points to the reasonableness of the collection and use of the identifying data
either to authenticate a person’s identity or to obtain investigative leads. A
259
categorical exception to the warrant requirement therefore is appropriate.
However, even if the categorical exception for biometric data acquisition
and use offers the least dangerous and most logical route to upholding a law
enforcement database system, it is not a Proceed-Directly-to-Go card for
AFIS or CODIS databases. For the exception to apply to these systems, the
information content of fingerprints and DNA samples and profiles must be
effectively limited to indicia of identity. Only then will the interests that
individuals have in withholding the information be tissue thin. If the
biometric data were used to infer thought processes or to uncover socially
sensitive information, then condition (4) would not hold. To the extent
that a biometric database houses such sensitive information, its existence
poses a risk that it will be used for something other than authentication and
developing leads to investigate.
Opponents of DNA-BC maintain that whereas ordinary fingerprints can
reveal nothing but randomness in the uterine environment, DNA profiles
may prove to contain individual health-related information, and DNA
260
samples already do.
In fact, some critics claim that the DNA variations

259

260

of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 47 (2001) (explaining that courts do not typically
evaluate the police officer’s subjective judgment at the time of the arrest and instead
apply an objective reasonableness standard); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”).
In opposition to this proposal, it has been said that
the Court has not created a new exception to the Fourth Amendment in decades,
and would likely do so now with great hesitation. The Supreme Court has never
approved a suspicionless search involving bodily intrusion for a law enforcement
purpose, and to do so here would be a substantial departure from traditional Fourth
Amendment principles.
Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock to the National
Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (footnote omitted). But
regardless of whether the Court would hesitate or seize on the exception described here,
the proposal is faithful to traditional Fourth Amendment principles. It is responsive to
the interest in freedom from bodily intrusion. The biometric information itself also is
not severely threatening to individual interests in informational privacy. A clear and
candid exception is less of a departure from traditional Fourth Amendment principles
than is naked totality balancing, and it is more direct than special-needs balancing for
intelligence databases.
E.g., Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(“[U]nlike DNA, a fingerprint says nothing about the person’s health, their propensity
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used for identification already are “medically relevant,” being “predictive of
medically important genes” and “disrupt[ing] the way that genes are
261
supposed to work, thereby causing disease.”
On this view, it would seem that fingerprinting qualifies for the
biometric exception, but DNA sampling does not. But Part V shows that this
view is oversimplified. It explains that DNA identification profiles are not
known to include disease-causing mutations or to be currently useful to
police, employers, or insurers who, it is said, might want genetic test results
from the DNA of suspected or convicted offenders. Conceivably, however,
determined officials could mine both fingerprints and DNA for more
sensitive information than they do now. Under the biometric exception, the
crucial question for both fingerprint and DNA databases then becomes
whether courts should trust the government to extract only the identifying
information. The answer, as discussed below, depends on the inherent or
legally mandated safeguards in the system.

V. THE BIOMETRIC EXCEPTION APPLIED
A. Fingerprints
The perception that fingerprints are nothing more than random marks
262
for differentiating among individuals is cultural, not scientific.
Friction
ridge skin develops in the fetus in response to genetics (largely determining
the overall ridge or pattern classification) and chaotic stresses (producing
263
minutiae in the path followed by particular ridges).
Therefore, some
features are similar between siblings, especially identical twins, whereas the
264
details of minutiae are random.
A serious medical literature exists on
correlations between abnormal features in friction ridge skin and

261

262
263
264

for particular disease, their race and gender characteristics, and perhaps even their
propensity for certain conduct.” (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 n.3
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gould, J. concurring))); Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic
DNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF
JUSTICE 173, 173 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
Adam Schwartz, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU of Illinois, Address at the Symposium on
Familial DNA Searching, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University
School of Law: DNA Familial Testing: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Concerns, at 2
(Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/SpeechDNA-familial-testing.pdf.
See Cole, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra note 149, at 117 18; COLE, Fingerprint Identification,
supra note 188, at 77.
R. Austin Hicklin, Anatomy of Friction Ridge Skin, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMETRICS 23, 26
(Stan Z. Li ed., 2009).
Id. at 27; see also Sarah B. Holt, Quantitative Genetics of Fingerprint Patterns, 17 BRIT. MED.
BULL. 247 (1961).
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Alzheimer’s, chromosome abnormalities, diabetes,
schizophrenia,
269
270
271
leukemia, thalassemia, and other diseases or conditions. This is not to
say that finger or palm prints are valid indicators of any of these conditions,
272
especially by themselves, but it does mean that medical researchers can
find correlations between different traits that are influenced by common
273
causes such as a disturbance in embryonic development.
Nevertheless, that fingerprint data from arrestees can have genetic and
medical significance does not make it a meaningful threat to privacy. The
correlations may be so weak and nonspecific as to make the features
worthless predictors of clinical conditions or predispositions. Moreover,
conditions such as major birth defects may be apparent to police and the
public in any event. The specter of a fingerprint database being used to
determine the medical status or predispositions of arrestees is just that—an
apparition with little substance. Fingerprinting on arrest satisfies the
biometric exception to the warrant requirement.

B. DNA Profiles
The situation for a database of DNA profiles is more complex but
roughly similar. For practical purposes, “the DNA profile derived from the
defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record of the defendant’s

265

266
267
268

269
270
271
272
273

E.g., Brendan D. Kelly et al., Neurological Soft Signs and Dermatoglyphic Anomalies in Twins
with Schizophrenia, 19 EUR. PSYCH. 159, 161 (2004); Araceli Rosa et al., Further Evidence that
Congenital Dermatoglyphic Abnormalities Are Associated with Psychosis: A Twin Study, 28
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 697, 697 (2002); C.J. van Oel et al., Differentiating Between Low And
High Susceptibility To Schizophrenia In Twins: The Significance of Dermatoglyphic Indices in
Relation to Other Determinants of Brain Development, 52 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 181, 190–91
(2001).
E.g., Herman J. Weinreb, Fingerprint Patterns in Alzheimer’s Disease, 42 ARCHIVES OF
NEUROLOGY 50 (1985).
E.g., Terry Reed, Review: Dermatoglyphics in Medicine—Problems and Use in Suspected
Chromosome Abnormalities, 8 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 411, 418–24 (1981).
See, e.g., Henry S. Kahn et al., A Fingerprint Marker from Early Gestation Associated with
Diabetes in Middle Age: The Dutch Hunger Winter Families Study, 38 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
101 (2009).
Mario Joseph Bukelo et al., Palmar Dermatoglyphics in Children with Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukemia—A Preliminary Investigation, 18 J. FORENSIC LEGAL MED. 115 (2011).
Asena C. Dogramaci et al., Dermatoglyphs in Patients with Beta-Thalassemia Major and Their
Thalassemia Carrier Parents, 33 COLLEGIUM ANTROPOLOGICUM 607 (2009).
See e.g., Emily S. Todd et al., Characterization of Dermatoglyphics in PHOX2B-confirmed
Congenital Central Hypoventilation Syndrome, 118 PEDIATRICS e408 (2006).
See, e.g., Reed, supra note 267; Julian Verbov, Clinical Significance and Genetics of Epidermal
Ridges—A Review of Dermatoglyphics, 54 J. INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 261 (1970).
See, e.g., Blanka A. Schaumann & John M. Opitz, Clinical Aspects of Dermatoglyphics, 27
BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLES SERIES 193 (1991).
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274

identity” —at least, for now, and with the caveat that this record is
inherited and therefore can be used for parentage testing when the profiles
of possible parents also are known. This section explains these conclusions.
It introduces the terminology and basic ideas about the nature and
operation of human genes, describes what is known about the locations and
properties of the DNA sequences used in Combined DNA Index System
(“CODIS”) databases, and notes the limitations on this knowledge.

1. The Genetics of CODIS Profiles275
A CODIS profile is basically a set of thirteen pairs of arbitrary
276
numbers.
Each pair comes from a particular location (a “locus”) on the
pair of chromosomes that we normally inherit from our two parents. The
numbers stand for the number of back-to-back copies of short DNA
sequences called short tandem repeats (“STRs”). STRs resemble freight
trains with different numbers of box cars—the more box cars, the longer the
STR train. Each different number of box-car-like repeats is called an
“allele.” The D5S818 locus, for example, is a place on chromosome 5 where
people have an ATAG repeat. The most common such alleles are 11, 12,
and 13; they make up over 85% of the alleles found in most major
277
population groups in America.
A man with eleven repeats on one copy of
chromosome 5 and thirteen repeats on his other copy would have the type
(11, 13)—meaning that he inherited the sequence (ATAG)1l from one

274
275

276

277

People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65 (Cal. 2010) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion)).
Most of the material in this section is drawn without further attribution from the Brief of
Genetics, Genomics, and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Scientists’ Brief], cert.
granted, No. 12-207, (U.S. Dec. 28, 2012), written by the author of this article, Hank
Greely, and “physicians, human geneticists, statistical geneticists, molecular biologists, or
other researchers in human genetics or forensic science” who include “members of the
Institute of Medicine, of committees of the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Institutes of Health, and [of] the editorial boards of numerous genetics
journals.” Id. at 1. For more detail on the biology and biochemistry of genes, see, for
example, JOCELYN E. KREBS ET AL., LEWIN’S ESSENTIAL GENES (3d ed. 2013), and JAMES D.
WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (6th ed. 2008). Nontechnical
presentations tailored to forensic genetics include DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX
AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010), and David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference
Guide on DNA Identification Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129,
129 210 (3d ed. 2011).
To cope with the growing size of the national DNA database (NDIS) and to achieve more
compatibility with the databases of other countries, the FBI is considering adding more
components to the profiles. Douglas R. Hares, Letter to the Editor, Expanding the CODIS
Core Loci in the United States, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS e52, e52 (2012).
John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequencies for 15 Autosomal STR Loci on U.S. Caucasian, African
American, and Hispanic Populations, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2003).
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All the CODIS STRs have
parent and (ATAG)13 from the other parent.
repeat units like ATAG, that are four “letters” (nucleotide bases) long,
making them “tetranucleotide repeats,” or “tetramers.” The complete set of
twenty-six numbers specifying how many tetramers are present at each locus
is the man’s CODIS profile.
For each locus, there is a range of repeat numbers observed in any
population. These variations (“polymorphisms”) result from the fact that
the molecule that copies DNA prior to cell division sometimes skips a repeat
279
unit or replicates the same unit twice.
In particular, a sperm or egg cell
can have a different number of repeats at a locus than the father or mother
inherited from their parents. This cell can result in a child with a novel
number of repeats. This does not happen frequently, but over the
generations, these new alleles can spread through the population. How
quickly and to what extent a new allele establishes itself depends on the
reproductive fitness of the individuals who carry it. If an allele is deleterious,
natural selection tends to prevent it from spreading and becoming a
permanent or major part of the population’s gene pool. The CODIS loci
were selected from the many STRs scattered across the human genome in
part because they have common alleles in all the major U.S. population
groups and were not known to have any substantial disease associations in
these populations. That is, they represent common, normal human
variation.
Genes are DNA sequences that are “expressed” as proteins or as
ribonucleic acid (“RNA”), a single-stranded molecule that is similar to DNA.
In the first major step of the expression of proteins, the sequence
information in “exons” and “introns” is copied into “precursor messenger
RNA” (“pre-mRNA”). In the second major step, this pre-mRNA is modified
at its ends, and parts that were copied from the “introns” of the gene are cut
away (“spliced”). This processing of the pre-mRNA reduces the size of the
transcript (often dramatically), protects it from being degraded, and
facilitates its transportation from the cell nucleus to structures known as
“ribosomes.” In the third step, the mature mRNA, having moved to the
ribosomes, is “translated” into a protein product. Because the sequence
information in the gene’s exons determines the mRNA sequence, and the
mRNA sequence determines the structure of the protein, the gene is said to
“encode” the protein.
In addition to the exons and introns, the gene has untranslated regions
(“UTRs”) before the first exon and after the last one. These UTRs contain

278
279

(ATAG)n denotes n ATAG repeats. For instance, (ATAG)5 is (ATAG)(ATAG)(ATAG)
(ATAG)(ATAG).
KREBS ET AL., supra note 275, at 24 (describing the result as “slippery sequence[s]”).

Apr. 2013]

ARRESTEE DNA

1145

regulatory information about initiating and sometimes terminating
transcription as well as splicing. Genes often are defined as the sequence
from the leading UTR, through the exons and introns, and ending with the
280
trailing UTR.
Outside this region, in the “intergenic” spaces between
genes, are “promoters,” “silencers,” and “enhancers” that help turn genes on
and off or modulate the quantity of the proteins or RNAs that the genes
encode. In addition, the intergenic DNA includes apparently nonfunctional
gene fragments, pseudogenes, and transposable elements that can move
from one place in the genome to another (usually leaving the original copy
behind).
STRs can be located inside—or outside—of genes and intergenic
regulatory elements. Because only three-letter “words” comprise the genetic
code that translates mRNA to protein, even a difference of a single fourletter tetramer within an exon could have a dramatic effect on the structure
of the protein product. What consequence, if any, this difference would
281
have on the health or other traits of an individual is a further question,
but not one that need be resolved here, for the CODIS loci all lie outside of
exons. Thus, they are not transcribed into stable mRNA (nor are they
known to be transcribed into smaller RNAs that regulate transcription and
translation). They also lie outside of UTRs and promoters. And, they are
282
not known to interfere with silencers or enhancers.
Although this is not
the end of the story, and there are other mechanisms by which the CODIS
STRs could regulate gene expression or be coincidental markers for diseases
or traits, these facts exclude several obvious ways in which the CODIS alleles
could be the basis for inferring a person’s present or future health.

2. “Considerable Current Debate?”
Judicial and other ink has been spent trying to make it appear that
CODIS STRs have some deep biological function that surely will turn them
into a source of highly personal and sensitive medical information. Judges
in the Ninth Circuit have suggested that the accidental repeat units “contain
283
useful genetic programming material.”
Four judges in United States v.
Kincade worried that “extensive information can, or potentially could, be

280
281

282
283

See, e.g., id. at 97 98. The ideal definition of a gene is the subject of vigorous debate.
Less disruptive triplet STRs within some of these regions are known to cause diseases, as
are some triplet STRs found within UTRs and promoters. The total lengths of these
triplet expansions lie well above the length range for CODIS STR polymorphisms. See,
e.g., Albert R. La Spada & J. Paul Taylor, Repeat Expansion Disease: Progress and Puzzles in
Disease Pathogenesis, 11 NATURE REV. GENETICS 247 (2010).
However, the locations of all these regulatory elements have yet to be ascertained.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
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These judges
gleaned from . . . even the ‘junk’ DNA currently used.”
chastised the majority of the en banc court in this DNA-AC case for not
recognizing that “[t]he DNA ‘fingerprint’ entered into CODIS likely has the
potential to reveal information about an individual’s ‘genetic defects,
285
predispositions to diseases, and perhaps even sexual orientation.’”
These
judges also accepted at face value the prediction “that the DNA profiles
entered into CODIS will someday be able to predict the likelihood that a
given individual will engage in certain types of criminal, or non-criminal but
286
perhaps socially disfavored, behavior.”
A similar perception apparently
underlies the district court’s claim in United States v. Mitchell that “even
though the taking of a sample may not be unreasonably intrusive, the search
of the sample is quite intrusive, severely affecting Mitchell’s expectation of
287
privacy in his most intimate matters.”
The Maryland Court of Appeals in
King was more circumspect, only claiming that there is “considerable current
debate as to whether these ‘non-coding’ or ‘junk’ DNA provide no
288
predictive genetic information.”
However, the “considerable current debate” has more to do with
projections for the future than with any current reality. That debate consists
289
of a flurry of law review essays written six or seven years ago.
First,
Professor Elizabeth Joh wrote in 2006 that DNA samples might be used to
290
lock people up on the basis of tests for a “crime gene,” that “markers now
thought to be meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain
291
predictive medical information,” that all military personnel were having
292
their DNA placed in a CODIS database, and that shed or “abandoned”
293
DNA “is a backdoor to population-wide data banking.”
Second, I wrote a

284
285
286
287
288
289

290
291
292

293

Id. at 842 (Gould, J., concurring).
Id. at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id.
United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2009); see also People v.
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 560 n.17 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
The treatise, 4 David L. Faigman et al., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 31:4, at 124 (2012), refers to “continued debates,”
although it cites no scholarship continuing the debate after 2007.
Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 876–77 (2006).
Id. at 870.
Id. at 879. In reality, the only way the military samples can be analyzed in a criminal
investigation is pursuant to court order in “an investigation or prosecution of a felony, or
any sexual offense, for which no other source of DNA information is reasonably
available.” 10 U.S.C. § 1565a (2006). The only way military samples can get into a federal
database is through convictions (and as of January 2006, arrests) of specific soldiers for
“qualifying military offense[s].” 10 U.S.C. § 1565.
Joh, supra note 290, at 874.
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With
short corrective essay dismissing these scenarios as “science fiction.”
regard to health predictions from the CODIS profiles, I argued that the
news articles on “junk DNA” that Professor Joh cited did not support her
position that CODIS STRs were or were about to become valuable in clinical
medicine or genetic counseling.
This exchange caught the eye of a professor of criminology, Simon Cole.
295
In an essay on “Junk DNA” maintaining that the previous essays were
oversimplified, Professor Cole rediscovered a point I had emphasized years
earlier—that even if a particular allele does not cause a genetic disease or
296
influence an observable trait, it could be associated with one.
Going far
beyond this theoretical possibility, however, Professor Cole insisted that
“some forensic STRs are already predictive . . . of disease, and more may
297
ultimately turn out to be.”
Professor Cole’s treatment of the genetics literature prompted a fourth
298
essay in this series.
In an analysis of the underlying relationships that
might permit predictions to be made, I tried to show that no CODIS locus
had been shown to be a useful predictor of health status and that even with
our advancing understanding of the mechanisms of gene expression and
regulation, it was unlikely that police, database administrators, employers, or
insurers soon would be able to look at a CODIS profile and make a
299
reasonable prediction about the individual’s present or future health.
At
300
301
that point, the “academic debate” closed with a whimper.

294

295
296

297
298
299

300

Kaye, Science Fiction, supra note 62, at 62–63. For a more extended assessment of the
prospects for finding a crime gene, see David H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and
Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (2006) [hereinafter Kaye,
Behavioral Genetics Research].
Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 61–
62 (2007).
David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
179, 187 (2001) (“[S]ome noncoding loci can indicate or predict disease states, and all
loci, coding and noncoding alike, can be used for parentage testing.”).
Cole, supra note 295, at 59 (emphasis changed from original).
David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2007).
Id. at 72–79. Professor Cole’s impression to the contrary, it seems, was based on
misreading words such as “linkage” and “loss of heterozygosity” in John M. Butler, Genetics
and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 253, 260 (2006); see also Schwartz, supra note 261, at 9 n.2 (misconstruing the same
article). The article’s author, a chemist at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, describes the entire debate as “really a non-issue,” JOHN M. BUTLER,
ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING 226 (2011), prompted by “a
misunderstanding by Simon Cole over some of the things I had written in a review article
on STR markers.” Id. at 228.
King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 560 n.17 (Md. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Maryland v. King,
No. 12-207 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012).
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3. Into the Unknown
Today, after some twenty years of research using CODIS loci and other
STRs as possible markers for disease-causing variations in genes, no
correlations that would allow valid predictions from the identification
profiles have emerged. To be sure, there have been a few reports of some
associations in some families or populations, but these associations have not
been consistently replicated and shown to be applicable to the populations
302
represented in U.S. databases. To the contrary, the most recent published
review concludes:
The . . . standard and recommended CODIS panels of STR
loci . . . continue to be of limited significance for assessing
phenotypes. . . . Several . . . overlay predicted sites for genomic
regulation, but there is no evidence that any particular repeat [is]
indicative of phenotype. The utility of the CODIS profile itself, even in
light of the significance of various epigenetic effects and roles of
303
noncoding RNAs, is limited to identification purposes at this time.
But “at this time” does not mean “for all time,” and some advocates and
legal scholars believe that recent discoveries regarding the complex system
304
305
of gene regulation sound a death knell —or at least a note of caution —

301

302

303
304

See Simon A. Cole, Coming Clean About “Junk DNA,” 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 107, 107
(2007) (“I agree that the recent exchange . . . has probably beaten the ‘junk DNA’ horse
past the point of expiration. One thing we all agree upon is that the potential privacy
violations engendered by the storage of forensic DNA profiles in law enforcement
databases is a ‘distraction’ . . . from the potential privacy issues posed by the storage of
DNA samples in law enforcement and other government repositories.”); David H. Kaye,
Mopping Up After Coming Clean About “Junk DNA”, Nov. 27, 2007 [hereinafter Mopping
Up], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1032094.
Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 23–24; see also infra text accompanying note 309. The
reader of only law review notes and treatises would not know this. See, e.g., Faigman et al.,
supra note 289; H. Brendan Burke, Note, A “Special Need” for Change: Fourth Amendment
Problems and Solutions Regarding DNA Databanking, 34 STETSON L. REV. 161, 165 (2004)
(“[J]unk DNA police use can also predict the subject’s susceptibility to diabetes.”); Ashley
Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to
Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2011) (“[J]unk DNA
is increasingly considered to contain predictive medical and behavioral information.”);
Jill C. Schaefer, Note, Profiling at the Cellular Level: The Future of the New York State DNA
Databanks, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 577–78 (2004) (“A few years ago British scientists
were able to find markers of susceptibility of type-one diabetes from Junk DNA.”).
Sara H. Katsanis & Jennifer K. Wagner, Characterization of the Standard and Recommended
CODIS Markers, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. S169 (2013).
New Research on “Junk” DNA Raises Questions on Eve of Crucial Court Hearing, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/new-research-on-junkdna-raises-questions (“[R]esearch . . . confirms for the first time that over 80% of our
DNA that was once thought to have no function, actually plays a critical role in
controlling how our cells, tissue and organs behave . . . . [T]he ENCODE research
reinforces the points we’ve made multiple times before—that DNA—whether it is in the
form of a full genetic sample or an extracted profile—can reveal an extraordinary
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for continued assurances that CODIS profiles are not powerfully predictive.
Caution about the future is wise, as the chicken discovered when the farmer
who invariably had fed her every morning arrived the next day to wring her
306
neck.
A deeper understanding of gene regulation could show how some
CODIS alleles actually do alter levels of gene activity so as to cause a disease.
307
In fact, a few STRs in the introns of genes have been shown to regulate
308
splicing and hence to alter mRNA transcripts.
Only one of these is a
CODIS locus (TH01), and efforts to associate the lengths of the TH01 STRs
with diseases have produced inconsistent results and no useful disease
predictions. Some researchers report no associations with any alleles in the
TH01 STR locus. Some report positive associations with one allele. Some
report negative associations with one allele. No two sets of researchers
309
report associations with the same alleles.
Still, future discoveries about

305
306
307
308

309

amount of private information about you, including familial relationships, medical
history, predisposition for disease, and possibly even behavioral tendencies and sexual
orientation.” (internal citations omitted)).
Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 759–60
(2011) (hypothesizing, with no analysis, that the CODIS STRs could be regulatory).
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 63 (1912) (“[M]ore refined views as
to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.”).
At least five CODIS loci reside in introns.
By altering splicing, an STR locus could influence levels of output or relative amounts of
alternative forms of a transcript. See Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 20; see also Joshua
D. Groman et al., Variation in a Repeat Sequence Determines Whether a Common Variant of the
Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Conductance Regulator Gene Is Pathogenic or Benign, 74 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 176, 179 (2004) (relating variable penetrance of a TTTTT sequence in
intron 8 of the CFTR gene to longer (12 or 13 as opposed to 11) adjacent TG repeats;
however, given that the disease phenotype requires a severe mutation on the other CFTR
gene, even if the TG STR were among the CODIS alleles, a database record could not be
used to predict the presence of the genetic disease). CODIS loci also might cause disease
if they are transcribed to a kind of noncoding RNA that affects the quantity of a protein
expressed in a cell. No such transcription has been observed. Scientists’ Brief, supra, at
19.
See E. Burgert et al., No Association Between the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Microsatellite Marker
HUMTH01 and Schizophrenia or Bipolar I Disorder, 8 PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS 45 (1998)
(finding no statistically significant association with the 10-repeat allele in a French sample
from Alsace); Renata Jacewicz et al., Association of the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Polymorphism
with Schizophrenia in the Population of Central Poland, 42 PSYCHIATRIA POLSKA 583 (2008)
(tentatively reporting a minor positive association with the 7-repeat allele and a minor
negative one with the 9.3-repeat allele); Erik G. Jönnsson et al., Failure to Replicate an
Association Between a Rare Allele of a Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Microsatellite and Schizophrenia,
248 EUR. ARCH. PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 61, 62 (1998) (“[A] significant
difference in overall tyrosine hydroxylase allele distribution was found between psychotic
patients and control subjects.”); A. Kurumaji et al., An Association of the Polymorphic Repeat
of Tetranucleotide (TCAT) in the First Intron of the Human Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene with
Schizophrenia in a Japanese Sample, 108 J. NEURAL TRANSM. 489, 491 (2001) (discovering no
statistically significant associations for males in a Japanese sample and reduced incidence
of the (6, 9) type in females); Rolando Meloni et al., A Rare Allele of a Microsatellite Located
in the Tyrosine Hydroxylase Gene Found in Schizophrenic Patients, 318 COMPTES RENDU DE
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STRs, together with more refined diagnostic classifications based on
molecular methods, might lead to clinically meaningful predictions or
diagnoses. Certainly, the previous decades of failure to find consistent
associations between CODIS loci and disease status are not a logically
conclusive argument.
It should be equally clear, however, that decisions of constitutional (or
legislative) magnitude should not be based on the impression that all DNA
sequence data will prove to be biologically significant and clinically
310
applicable.
Contrary to impressions generated by “hyperbolic” media
reports that 80% of the genome has been shown to be functional, no
scientific publications state “that 100% or even 80% of the genome makes
organs function, stimulates tissue growth, turns normal cells into cancerous
311
ones, makes us tall or short, fat or skinny, gay or straight.”
Furthermore,
parts of the human genome could be replaced with a random sequence of
312
DNA with no observable consequences. In addition, the lack of detectable
313
selection pressure on the CODIS loci is reassuring.
Finally, considering
the interactions of multiple genes and environmental factors, it is a safe bet

310

311

312

313

L’ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES SÉRIE III 803, 806–07 (1995) (demonstrating that in French
and Tunisian samples, a 10-repeat allele was seen in 5% and 9% of chronic schizophrenic
patients, respectively, and in no unaffected control subjects).
Neither should they be made on the basis of assurances that simply because CODIS STRs
are intergenic, they contain absolutely no information about any and all traits. That
claim would be oversimplified. See Kaye, supra note 296 and accompanying text.
Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 31. On the sorry state of the science journalism, see,
e.g., John Timmer, Most of What You Read Was Wrong: How Press Releases Rewrote Scientific
History, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 10, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/staff/2012/09/most-ofwhat-you-read-was-wrong-how-press-releases-rewrote-scientific-history (last visited Dec. 16,
2012).
See Sean R. Eddy, The C-value Paradox, Junk DNA and ENCODE, 22 CURRENT BIOLOGY
R898, R899 (2012). In an affidavit, Professor Erin Murphy argued that there is a serious
privacy issue with profiles because “[n]o serious scientists have argued, much less proven,
for instance, that human beings could be reproduced without their ‘junk’ DNA without
any consequences.” Declaration of Erin Murphy in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief re:
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at ¶12, Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (No. C 09-4779 CRB) [hereinafter Declaration of Erin Murphy]. In fact, it has
been shown that very complex organisms can reproduce with major chunks of noncoding
DNA deleted. Marcelo A. Nóbrega et al., Megabase Deletions of Gene Deserts Result in Viable
Mice, 431 NATURE 988, 988 (2004). Forty years ago, “serious scientists” knew that
“centromeric heterochromatin which represents a long tandem repeat of a short
untranscribable sequence can be lost or duplicated without deleterious consequences.”
Susuno Ohno, So Much “Junk” DNA in Our Genome, 23 BROOKHAVEN SYMPOSIA IN BIOLOGY
366, 367 (1972) (internal citations omitted). Serious scientists do not ask whether all
noncoding DNA can be deleted with no ill effects. They ask “how much junk, how much
func?” Cristian I. Castillo-Davis, The Evolution of Noncoding DNA: How Much Junk, How
Much Func?, 21 TRENDS IN GENETICS 533, 533 (2005).
See Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 17.
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that no one will be able to deduce sexual orientation from either a
fingerprint pattern or a CODIS profile.

4. What Is the Question?
The Scientists’ Brief in King describes debates over the percentage of the
genome that is “junk” and how much evolutionary “treasure” may be buried
in intergenic regions as beguiling to biologists but “orthogonal” to the legal
314
issues.
From a Fourth Amendment perspective, the important question is
not whether there are any noncoding DNA sequences that do something
315
interesting or that have evolutionary significance. There are.
The
question is not whether there are other classes of STRs and still other types
316
of DNA sequences that are known to regulate gene expression. There are.
Moving to the relevant sequences—the CODIS loci used for identification—
the question is not whether these STRs are used to study the genetics of
317
diseases or other traits. They are.
And, the question is not whether some
traits are associated with the STRs. Ordinary ABO blood groups and serum
318
proteins—the forerunners of modern DNA methods of identification —are
phenotypes, and a local database of these phenotypes would not be

314
315
316

317

318

Id. at 26.
See, e.g., Ryan D. Walters et al., InvAluable Junk: The Cellular Impact and Function of Alu and
B2 RNAs, 61 INT’L UNION BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY LIFE 831, 831 (2009).
As previously noted, DNA sequences are transcribed to various noncoding RNAs. The
line of research has generated considerable excitement. See Alex S. Flynt & Eric C. Lai,
Biological Principles of MicroRNA-mediated Regulation: Shared Themes Amid Diversity, 9 NATURE
REV. GENETICS 831, 831 (2008) (“[S]ubsequent explosion of miRNA research in the
current decade has yielded breathtaking advances in our understanding of the
mechanism and biology of miRNA control”); Helge Grosshans & Witold Filipowicz,
Molecular Biology: The Expanding World of Small RNAs, 451 NATURE 414, 414 (2008)
(“[N]ew classes of small RNAs continue to be discovered”); John S. Mattick, RNA
Regulation: A New Genetics?, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 316, 317 (2004) (“This framework
might allow us to understand the true basis of the evolution and development
programming of complex organisms, and the basis of individual and species diversity.”);
Tim R. Mercer et al., Long Non-coding RNAs: Insights into Functions, 10 NATURE REV.
GENETICS 155, 155 (2009) (“[T]he discovery of new classes of regulatory non-coding
RNAs . . . suggests that RNA has continued to evolve and expand alongside proteins and
DNA.”).
E.g., Dongfeng Gu et al., Evidence of Multiple Causal Sites Affecting Weight in the IGF2-INS-TH
Region of Human Chromosome 11, 110 HUMAN GENETICS 173 (2002) (using TH01 and other
markers to study the relationship of a gene complex to obesity and height); Simona Neri,
Mismatch Repair System and Aging: Microsatellite Instability in Peripheral Blood Cells From
Differently Aged Participants, 60A J. GERONTOLOGY: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 285 (2005) (studying
differences in the frequencies of STR alleles at five loci by age).
See KAYE, supra note 275, at 6–7.
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objectionable merely because it catalogues an expressed (rather than a
319
predicted) physical or chemical trait.
The important question about the profiles recorded in a DNA database
is the actual risk that the STR length polymorphisms will become more than
320
marginally invasive of the informational privacy of an arrestee.
The
records are effective for their intended use of identification, but will they
have adverse side effects on constitutionally protected privacy? The
Scientists’ Brief observes that
even if some length differences of some of these STRs prevented or
increased transcription of regulatory RNAs, it would not necessarily
follow that they are “essential biological instructions for growth and
survival of an organism,” and therefore “sensitive and private.” They
might have no effect at all because there are alternative paths to the same
outcomes, or the affected traits might be no more significant than, say,
the thickness of the eyebrows or the width of the nose. One must ask
whether the length variations of the particular STRs actually convey
meaningful information, and they seem to contain less trait-related
321
information than a photograph of an arrestee.
If this is correct, the CODIS profiles contain the same kind of information as
dermal fingerprints.
Yet, there is one clear difference between CODIS profiles and other
biometric identifiers. The STRs, like the rest of the genome, are inherited
according to Mendel’s laws. An arrestee’s profile could be compared with
those of a putative mother and father to test whether the arrestee is their
biological child. In addition, pairs of profiles in the database could be
examined to see if two people might be related in a few ways (as parent and
child or as siblings). Although such kinship testing in a large database
would be inaccurate—it would miss many true relationships and would
322
include many false ones —it probably works better than drawing inferences

319

320

321

322

Laws like Rhode Island’s, which forbids the use of “DNA samples for purposes of
obtaining information about “physical characteristics,” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-10(5)
(2010), are overly restrictive.
Cf. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d, 1213 1230 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring)
(pointing out that the critical inquiry about a CODIS profile is whether it “categorically
differs from the information already contained in the booking photo lineups on the
bookshelf of virtually every police station in the country”).
Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 29–30; see also Mark Benecke, Coding or Non-coding?,
That is the Question, 3 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 498, 500 (2002) (“[A]n old
black-and-white mugshot . . . reveals a lot more about the person’s physical, social and
maybe even mental state than the anonymous patterns in genetic fingerprints.”).
James M. Curran & John S. Buckleton, Effectiveness of Familial Searches, 84 SCI. & JUST. 164
(2008); Jianye Ge et al., Comparisons of Familial DNA Database Searching Policies, 56 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1448 (2011); Steven P. Myers et al., Searching for First-Degree Familial
Relationships in California’s Offender DNA Database: Validation of a Likelihood Ratio-Based
Approach, 5 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 493 (2011).
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323

from the inherited parts of fingerprints. The fact that alleles are inherited
324
implies that they supply (typically weak)
information about genetic
relationships between individuals in the database. It also means that the
profiles contain even noisier information about bio-geographic origins in
325
that CODIS profiles are weakly correlated to ancestry and hence to socially
326
perceived race or ethnicity.
These considerations undermine simplistic analogies between
327
fingerprints and CODIS loci,
but they do not make the noncoding,
nonregulatory, nontranscribed, and nonconserved DNA identification loci
highly toxic to personal privacy. The profiles are not well suited to inferring
bio-geographical history, let alone social race—and police would almost
always have better, nongenetic information about the apparent race of an
328
arrested individual.
Certainly, the limited information that CODIS loci
now supply does not begin to approach that of the hormones indicative of
pregnancy or diabetes, which were part of the “host of private medical facts”
that, together with “visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination,”
prompted the Court to hold in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
329
Association
that compulsory urine sampling interfered with reasonable
expectations of privacy. Like fingerprints and photographs, CODIS STR
profiles should fall within the biometric exception.

C. DNA Samples
DNA identification profiles represent a trivial fraction of the more than
three billion base pairs in the human genome. DNA samples contain the
full genome, and in most database systems, the state retains these samples

323

324
325

326

327
328
329

On the constitutionality of this practice as applied to partial matches between crime
scene and database profiles, see David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional
Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. No. 1 (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043091.
They could, of course, be used to test whether two profiles come from identical twins.
Referring to a larger set of STR loci than the thirteen core CODIS loci, Richard S.
Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1167 (2003), noted that
The success of microsatellite loci in classifying persons according to continental
group depends in part on the cumulative effect of minor differences in the
frequencies of common alleles and in part on the effect of population-specific
alleles. In neither case is it apparent that such differences have relevance for traits
that are important to health. Most population-specific microsatellite alleles are
unlikely to be functional; rather, like a last name, they merely help to verify the
geographic origin of a person’s ancestry.
See, e.g., Jennifer B. Listman et al., Identification of Population Substructure Among Jews Using
STR Markers and Dependence on Reference Populations Included, 11 BMC GENETICS No. 48
(2010), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2156-11-48.pdf.
See Kaye, Bury the Junk, supra note 298, at 80.
Scientists’ Brief, supra note 275, at 36 n.27.
489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
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even after it generates the profiles.
Impressed with the potential
information in the entire genome, plaintiffs challenging California’s
330
arrestee DNA law in Haskell v. Brown went beyond the “But it’s not junk!”
response to the fingerprinting analogy. They argued “that DNA is different
because it is ‘something of mine which is very personal,’ ‘the building blocks
331
of our existence,’ and implicates ‘our personhood’ . . . .”
This vision of
the genetic material as determinative of each person’s essential nature and
fate pervades popular culture. Influenced by metaphors of DNA as a “future
332
333
diary” or “the entire blueprint for an individual’s life,” and of each
334
chromosome as a “chapter in the book of life,” we have come to regard
335
ourselves as puppets dancing on the strings of our DNA.
The district
court in Haskell found such expressions of genetic essentialism “emotionally
336
stirring, but not legally compelling.”
A more measured argument about the information that could be
extracted from DNA samples (as opposed to the identification profiles)
relies on the correct premise that our genes (along with other things) have a
great deal to do with a wide range of physical and mental traits. To
recognize the importance of genes in conjunction with internal and external
environments is not to succumb to genetic determinism. Some genes
determine some traits almost regardless of the external environment. Blood
and tissue types, or fingerprint ridge counts, are examples. Certain alleles at
other single loci cause debilitating or fatal diseases in a wide range of
environments. That is why these rare diseases are called genetic. Genes are
involved in the metabolism of drugs, and some success has been achieved in
337
tailoring drug prescriptions to individual genomes. Combinations of large
numbers of genes, acting together in particular environments, influence
susceptibility to common diseases and highly variable features such as

330
331
332
333
334

335
336
337

677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom., Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2012).
Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded ‘Future Diaries’, 270 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 2346, 2346 (1993).
Declaration of Erin Murphy, supra note 312, ¶10.
See Nicholas Wade, Life Is Pared to Basics; Complex Issues Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at
F3 (reporting the concern expressed by a medical ethicist that “when biologists
sequenced the first human chromosome last month, they called it ‘the first chapter in the
book of life, as if life is chromosomes’”).
See generally DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON (1995).
Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
VOGEL AND MOTULSKY’S HUMAN GENETICS: PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 644 (Michael R.
Speicher et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).
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338

height. These are polygenetic systems of quantitative trait loci that are far
339
more difficult to elucidate than the simple Mendelian genetic disorders.
Thus, the “personalized medicine” promised by the Human Genome Project
340
341
is progressing, but it has been slow to materialize.
The privacy implications—with respect to law enforcement DNA
databanks—of our growing knowledge of genomics are not as clear cut as
frenzied references to “over four thousand types of genetic conditions and
diseases” and “genetic markers for traits including aggression, sexual
342
orientation, substance addiction, and criminal tendencies” might suggest.
Many of the diseases resulting from highly penetrant genes will have
manifested themselves long before an arrest. It is hard to imagine why
database custodians would want to test DNA for such conditions, and “crime
343
genes” never will be found.
But in seeking to restore a sense of balance, I
am also quibbling. There is no doubt that the physical samples (as
distinguished from the records in the databases) contain a “host of private
344
medical facts.”
Genetic tests could identify carriers of recessive diseases
345
346
347
such as cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Tay-Sachs disease.
They
can detect alleles that are protective or predisposing for presymptomatic
338

339
340

341

342
343
344
345

346

347

See, e.g., Neil J. Risch, Searching for Genetic Determinants in the New Millennium, 405 NATURE
847, 850 (2000) (“[N]umerous genes of smaller effect . . . are likely to underlie most
common, familial traits and diseases in humans.”).
Id.
Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010) (“Researchers have discovered hundreds of genes that
harbor variations contributing to human illness, identified genetic variability in patients’
responses to dozens of treatments, and begun to target the molecular causes of some
diseases. In addition, scientists are developing and using diagnostic tests based on
genetics or other molecular mechanisms to better predict patients’ responses to targeted
therapy.”).
It could be that common diseases simply do not have common variants that can be
detected in genome-wide association studies. At the genetic level, every person’s
predisposition to common diseases could relate to very rare alleles at various loci. See
VOGEL AND MOTULSKY’S HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 337, at 643; Nicholas Wade, A
Dissenting Voice as the Genome Is Sifted to Fight Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at F3.
United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
See Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 268 69 (arguing that behavior is
affected by many genes, each with limited effect).
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Cystic Fibrosis, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/cystic-fibrosis (last reviewed Aug. 2012) (explaining
that cystic fibrosis is caused by a single, recessive gene, although other genes may
exacerbate the problem).
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Sickle Cell Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/sickle-cell-disease (last visited Aug. 2012) (explaining
that sickle cell disease is caused by a single, recessive gene).
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Tay-Sachs Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/tay-sachs-disease (last visited Oct. 2012) (explaining
that Tay-Sachs disease is caused by a single, recessive gene).
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individuals, such as those of the ApoE gene that is a risk factor in many cases
348
of Alzheimer disease.
Whether the existence of such genetic tests defeats the application of the
biometric exception should depend on an assessment of the incentives and
disincentives for police to perform genetic tests at socially and medically
significant loci. (Indeed, valid privacy concerns are not limited to DNA
tests, for a range of biomarkers in biological evidence and samples could be
349
used in diagnostic testing for major diseases.)
Existing database statutes
limit the use of the samples to identifying the individuals whose DNA is
350
recovered from crime scenes or victims.
Thus, the government
laboratories that generate identification profiles from arrestee samples are
not equipped to test for the plethora of health-related loci; moreover,
devices to automate the profiling—and that are incapable of analyzing other
351
loci—are under development.
However, a laboratory worker interested in
the health status of an arrestee could smuggle a portion of the sample for
testing at another laboratory, and inexpensive, portable devices for diseaserelated loci also could become available in the future.
But what would motivate police to undertake or facilitate surreptitious
genetic testing at 4000 disease-related or other loci? It is not as if there is a
market for this information. And, even if employers and insurance
companies were anxious to use genetic testing in hiring or underwriting
(notwithstanding state and federal laws enacted to prevent perceived or
352
anticipated “genetic discrimination”), there are less dangerous ways to
acquire information or samples than enlisting police officials in this illegal
348

349

350

351

352

See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Alzheimer Disease, GENETIC HOME REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/alzheimer-disease (last reviewed Dec. 2008)
(describing the ApoE gene as a risk factor for late-onset Alzheimer disease). Indeed,
“[p]eople carrying certain mutations in any of three genes—the presenilin genes PSEN1
and PSEN2 and the gene for the amyloid- precursor protein APP—can be told with
certainty that they will contract the disease (if they live long enough).” David Cyranoski,
Alzheimer’s Disease Genes Aid the Search for Preventive Drugs, NATURE, July 22, 2011,
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110722/full/news.2011.433.html.
See, e.g., Susan Gaidos, A Spitting Image of Health: How Saliva Can Help Doctors Diagnose
Disease, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 19, 2011, at 26 (describing biomarkers in saliva for “diseases such
as breast cancer, type 2 diabetes and Alzheimer’s”).
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 275. Existing database statutes permit
certain forms of statistical research with anonymized profiles—not samples. Id. at
275 76.
See, e.g., Carmen R. Reedy et al., A Modular Microfluidic System for Deoxyribonucleic Acid
Identification by Short Tandem Repeat Analysis, 687 ANALYTICA CHIMICA ACTA 150, 150
(2011) (describing one such device that analyzes nine STR loci); see also supra note 202.
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 295, at 55 (describing concerns expressed in Tania Simoncelli &
Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA
Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 288 (2005)); Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and
Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 837 38 (2008) (discussing
federal protections against genetic discrimination and their shortcomings).
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353

Perhaps an individual officer or laboratory worker with a grudge
effort.
against an arrestee would seek satisfaction by trying to acquire medically354
relevant genetic information, but such cases are likely to be quite rare.
Then too, there is the possibility that the law will change to allow the
samples to be used for nefarious purposes. Abuses that have been suggested
include testing ancestry-informative loci “to round up individuals of a
355
certain ethnic descent” for World War II style internment camps,
356
conducting research to identify genotypes associated with criminality, and
expanding the databases to incorporate “genetic profiles for violence,
aggression, or introversion and then focusing an investigation on those
individuals whose profiles match that of the unknown suspect, as described
357
by a witness or evidenced through a crime.”
Justice Holmes famously responded to the argument that the
government might misuse the power to tax with the assurance that “[t]he
358
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”
Likewise,
359
the Pool majority responded to the fears about “function creep” as follows:
[B]eyond the fact that the DNA Act itself provides protections against
such misuse, our job is limited to resolving the constitutionality of the
program before us, as it is designed and as it has been implemented. In
our system of government, courts base decisions not on dramatic
Hollywood fantasies . . . but on concretely particularized facts developed
in the cauldron of the adversary process and reduced to an assessable
record. If . . . and when, some future program permits the parade of
horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—unregulated disclosure of
CODIS profiles to private parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored

353

354

355
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357
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359

The Mitchell court paid particular attention to administrative and statutory “safeguards to
prevent the improper use of DNA samples” and “the safeguards attendant to DNA
collection and analysis.” United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 399, 407 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004) (“we do not believe that an Edmond-type
rule is needed to prevent an unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints. Practical
considerations—namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traff
ic tieups—seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
601 02 (1977) (rejecting as speculative arguments about unauthorized disclosure of
records of drug prescriptions in a law enforcement database maintained by the state
department of health).
Cole, supra note 295, at 55.
See Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note 294, at 260 (collecting objections to
research into “crime genes” and the like).
John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and
Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 622 n.10 (2009).
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928).
Barbara Prainsack, Key Issues in DNA Profiling and Databasing: Implications for Governance, in
GENETIC SUSPECTS, supra note 3, at 15, 28 32.
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eugenics . . . —we have every confidence that courts will respond
360
appropriately.

In short, if the motivation to scan an arrestee’s health-related and ancestryinformative loci is slight, if the means to do so are not readily available, and
if the mechanisms for detecting and punishing abuse are effective, then the
retention of samples should not defeat the biometric exception for DNA
databanks.
Furthermore, comprehensive and indefinite sample retention is not
361
essential to DNA databases.
A laboratory can destroy the samples after
generating the identifying profiles. Eliminating the sample repository leaves
a system that comes close to the collection and storage of fingerprint images.
To be sure, some risk of diverting the DNA samples from arrestees would
remain even though the samples are in the hands of the police for only a
short interval. No system is foolproof. Thus, the analogy to fingerprinting,
362
even with sample destruction, is not perfect. But neither is it “pure folly.”
With no samples retained, DNA sampling on arrest should fall within the
biometric exception described here.

CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of DNA sampling on arrest has divided the courts.
This Article has traced the possible routes to a resolution of the issue. These
routes do not proceed in a simple, straight line. The first fork in the road
was whether to regard the procedure for acquiring information as a “search”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I did not explore this
question deeply, but took the view that data acquisition triggers the
Amendment’s protection. On this assumption, the second fork was whether
to move directly to a reasonableness balancing. We saw that the Justices
have been conflicted (or divided) on this, but the dominant mode of
analysis remains classifying rather than balancing. That is, the search is
subject to the warrant requirement as modified by a finite number of
categorical exceptions. One of these exceptions, “special needs,” is unique
because it entails balancing (at a programmatic level), but it is still part of
the classificatory framework for analysis. The third fork (assuming one
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361
362

United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 38 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (footnotes
omitted)). The Third Circuit sidestepped arguments about sample retention, stating that
“to the extent that Mitchell submits that the potential future indefinite retention of his
sample implicates privacy concerns, that issue is not before us now.” United States v.
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
On the limited value of sample retention, see Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research, supra note
294, at 270 73.
United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
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adheres to classifying rather than direct totality balancing), is eligibility for
the special-needs balancing. I argued that a biometric database used solely
for criminal intelligence is ineligible. If the database is used for both
authentication and intelligence, however, I suggested that special-needs
balancing ought to be available.
But a court (especially the Supreme Court) need not take the second
and third forks. It should evaluate biometric databases under a hitherto
unarticulated exception to the warrant requirement. If such an exception
applies, it circumvents all the problems we encountered: the hazards in
abandoning the warrant rule in favor of totality balancing; the ambiguity in
determining whether the intelligence function is itself a special need; and
the two-step shuffle if it is not. The appropriate exception should permit
warrantless acquisition and use of biometric data when the information is
acquired with minimal impact on freedom of movement and bodily
integrity, and is limited to establishing and authenticating an individual’s
identity and to linking individuals to identifying marks or material from
crime scenes.
Fingerprinting more clearly falls within this exception than does DNA
profiling. But the difference is narrower than some courts have assumed
(and wider than others have realized). Both fingerprints and CODIS
profiles might contain disease-related information, but to date, neither
police, database administrators, insurers, nor employers can infer much of
anything about the present and future health status of an arrestee from
either a CODIS record or a fingerprint. CODIS records could have more to
say about relatedness and ancestry than do fingerprints, and retained DNA
samples certainly are a rich source of information on all these matters.
Thus, it may take greater effort to confine DNA acquisition and databasing
to the authentication and criminal intelligence functions of biometric
identifiers, but a properly administered system for establishing and trawling
DNA databases should fall within this exception for biometric data.
Recognizing a new exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment may seem radical. However, the exceptions are not ancient
specimens of an extinct species frozen in Devonian amber. They are living
creations whose structures continue to evolve and whose number is not
363
fixed. Although new exceptions are not created lightly, there are powerful
crime-control and other law enforcement reasons for a state to maintain
fingerprint and DNA databases for arrestees, the databases can be structured
to respect most individual privacy interests, they can be administered fairly,
and they can be accommodated with a specific and limited exception to the
warrant requirement. Consequently, it is neither heretical nor Quixotic to
363

See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 91 (1978).
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Like a brief stop
ask whether such an exception should be recognized.
and frisk, the acquisition of the biometric data is a lesser intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests than are ordinary searches of personal property and
dwellings. Therefore, the balance of interests that normally mandates
365
probable cause and a warrant does not apply. As in Terry v. Ohio, which
allows less intrusive, warrantless searches on reasonable suspicion, a
mechanical application of the Warrant Clause would not be appropriate.
Indeed, when biometric data are useful purely for individual identification,
the normal demand for a warrant pursuant to probable cause is not an
integral part of the reasonableness that the Fourth Amendment requires.
This conclusion simplifies the constitutional question.
With the
biometric exception in place, the issue becomes whether a particular
fingerprint or DNA database has sufficient protections to ensure that the
366
samples and data are used strictly for identification. Although the wisdom
367
of taking DNA before conviction is debatable, the practice is within the
368
zone of permissible legislative experimentation.
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Kaye, Arrest, supra note 7, at 498 99.
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a database and
repository of prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs in which the state had (1) a
“statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures,” id. at 605, (2) physical
measures to ensure security, id. at 594, and (3) a history of operation that had not been
marked by breaches of confidentiality, id. at 601 n.27).
Whether a database that is limited to authentication and criminal intelligence gathering
should include arrestees is a complex question. This legislative issue involves not only the
interests in crime-control and individual liberties, but also the costs of collecting and
analyzing the additional samples and policing the system to reduce the risk of abuse. In
addition, it raises concerns about the disparate impact of DNA databases on racial and
ethnic minorities who are overrepresented in the population of arrestees. See Kaye, Arrest,
supra note 7, at 508 n.231.
Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597 (“[I]ndividual States have broad latitude in experimenting
with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern.”).

